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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN F~~iOTCOURT 
IFffilll1i J11o:l!ci8li Dli>irl•:11 
0&.ITTl;y of"f'!i'Jin F1::1fts <> State of Jct131hv 
OCT 3 0 2007 P/71. l'()/ 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, ) 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ) 
ROBERT LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and ) 
TAMARA HALL, natural children ) 
of ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
i;Jy --.fj'fr:"------L~- @IW, 
"'""'""""'. --.._, _ _, /lii'mill)Yi'.r!!iftV~ 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
Corporation and 
THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV 2005-4345 
FINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: I will now give you the final jury instructions in this 
case. These Final Jury Instructions, along with the Preliminary Jury Instructions which 
were given to you earlier in the trial, will control your deliberations. A copy of these 
instructions is being provided to each of you for your use during deliberations, and you 
may highlight or make notes upon them as you wish. After I have given you these 
instructions, counsel for the parties will deliver their closing arguments. 
411 
Instruction No. J1-
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instmctions. 
There may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there is, you 
should not concern yourselves about such gap. 
412 
Instruction No. I S 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
' ' ') 4 .i ,) 
Instruction No. 1.6_ 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on the proposition, or use the 
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the 
proposition is more probably than not true. 
j 
Instruction No. l1_ 
On the claim of medical negligence against Dr. Clinton Dille, M.D. for failure to 
meet the standard of care, the plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the 
following propositions: 
1. That Dr. Dille failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in 
these instructions; 
2. That Mrs. Schmechel died; 
3. That the acts of Dr. Dille which failed to meet the applicable standard of 
care were a proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions 
has been proven, your verdict should be for the plaintiffs; however, if you find that any 
one or more of these propositions has not been proven, then the plaintiffs have not met 
the burden of proof required and your verdict should be for Dr. Dille. 
Instruction No. JL 
On the claim of medical negligence against Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. for failure to 
meet the standard of care, the plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the 
following propositions: 
1. That Mr. Byrne failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in 
these instructions; 
2. That Mrs. Schmechel died; 
3. That the acts of Mr. Byrne which failed to meet the applicable standard of 
care were a proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions 
has been proven, your verdict should be for the plaintiffs; however, if you find that any 
one or more of these propositions has not been proven, then the plaintiffs have not met 
the burden of proof required and your verdict should be for Mr. Byrne. 
Instruction No. Jj_ 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the damage complained of. It need not be the 
only cause. It is sufficent if it is a substantial factor concurring with some other cause 
acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the damage. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent 
conduct of two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial 
factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the 
injury regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury. 
4 ' ·1 J, 
Instruction No. dD 
A cause can be a substantial contributing cause even though the injury, damage 
or loss would have occurred anyway without the contributing cause. A substantial 
cause need not be the sole factor, or even the primary factor in causing the plaintiff's 
injuries, but merely a substantial factor therein. 
418 
Instruction No. d- \ 
To prove that Dr. Dille was "negligent," the plaintiffs must prove, by direct 
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Dr. 
Dille failed to meet the standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, Idaho, as such 
standard existed from September 26, 2003 through October 2, 2003, with respect to the 
class of health care provider to which Dr. Dille belonged and in which he was 
functioning; here, a board certified anesthesiologist specializing in pain management. 
A doctor such as Dr. Dille, shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained 
and qualified doctors in the same community taking into account his training, 
experience and field of specialization. 
Instruction No.~ 
To prove that Mr. Byrne was "negligent," the plaintiffs must prove, by direct 
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Mr. 
Byrne failed to meet the standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, Idaho, as such 
standard existed from September 26, 2003 through October 2, 2003, with respect to the 
class of health care provider to which Mr. Byrne belonged and in which he was 
functioning; here, a physician assistant. 
A physician assistant, such as Mr. Byrne, shall be judged in comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified physician assistants in the same community taking into 
account his training, experience and field of specialization. 
4 z: O 
Instruction No. d-,5, 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use 
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary 
care" mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar 
to those shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do 
something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a 
reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by 
the evidence. 
4?' 
• ;.,,. .I.. 
Instruction No. d Y 
A health care provider undertaking the treatment or care of a patient has a duty 
to possess and exercise that degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and 
exercised by other health care providers who are trained and qualified in the same or a 
similar field of care and who practice in the community in which such care was 
provided at the time it was provided, in September and October 2003. It is further the 
duty of health care providers to use reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of their 
skill and the application of their learning. 
The defendants Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille are health care providers within the 
meaning of this instruction. 
422 
Instruction No.J-5 
You must determine the applicable standard of health care practice required of 
the Defendants and any breach thereof only from the testimony of those persons, 
including Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne who have testifed as expert witnesses as to such 
standard in this case. 
Instruction No. 0~ 
As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that geographical 
area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which the 
medical care complained of was or allegedly should have been provided. 
Instruction No. d 1 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to 
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. 
425 
Instruction No.~ 
You are instructed that the court takes judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act, § 22.01.03 (2003), entitled "Rules for the Licensure of Physician 
Assistants." The rules were in effect in 2003. 
426 
Instruction No. d 1 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any 
opinion as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages. 
Instruction No. 50 
If the jury decides the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the Defendants, the 
jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate 
the Plaintiffs for any damages proved to be proximately caused by Defendants' 
negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
Economic Damages 
1. The reasonable cost of Rosalie Schmechel' s funeral and headstone. 
Non-economic Damages 
2. The reasonable value to each of the Plaintiffs of the loss of the Rosalie 
Schmechel' s comfort, love, companionship, affections, guidance, training, services and 
society and the present cash value of any such loss that is reasonably certain to occur in 
the future, taking into consideration the life expectancy of the plaintiffs, the decedent's 
age and life expectancy, habits, disposition and any other circumstances shown by the 
evidence. 
428 
Instruction No. 5 / 
You are instructed that if you find the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages that you 
may award only such damages as have been proven by the Plaintiffs with reasonable 
certainty. 
Instruction No.~ 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in 
the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested 
at a reasonable rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the 
time and in the amount the future damages will be incurred. 
430 
Instruction No. ~ 
Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a female age 60 is 23.21 
years. Rosalie Schmechl was 60 years of age at the time of her death. This figure is not 
conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of life 
based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This 
data may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable 
life expectancy, including the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities. 
Instruction No. 2S Y 
Your award, if any, for plaintiffs' injuries will not be subject to any income taxes, 
and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award. 
Instruction No. 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the 
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise 
such care cannot be recovered. 
4 ', '.) v •.I 
Instruction No. :S 6 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or 
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If 
money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may 
not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the 
method of determining the amount of the damage award or percentage of negligence. 
4 ., . ' _;, 4 
Instruction No.~ 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least 
three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of 
each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a 
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an 
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your 
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if 
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight 
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is 
to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
4 ,, r:: J ,) 
Instruction No. '3J 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of 
you by the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As 
soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in 
the verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary 
that the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman 
alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so 
agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the 
bailiff, who will then return you into open court. 
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Instruction No.~ 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you 
may send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to 
communicate with me by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands 
on any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so 
byme. 
4 'l "I ,., ' 
Instruction No. Y 0 
In this case, you will return a Special Verdict consisting of a series of questions. 
In answering a question, you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in this 
case, that your choice of answer is more probably true than not true. Because the 
explanation on the form which you will have is part of my instructions to you, I will 
read the verdict form to you and explain it. It states: 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatory as follows: 
Question No. 1: Did defendant Clinton Dille, M.D., negligently fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice in this community in his care and treatment 
of Rosalie Schmechel? 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, then do not answer Question No. 2 and 
proceed directly to Question No. 3. 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2. 
Question No. 2: Was Dr. Dille's breach of the standard of care a proximate cause 
of Mrs. Schmechel's death? 
Answer to Question No. 2: Yes[_] No[_] 
Please answer Question No. 3. 
Question No. 3: Did defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. negligently fail to meet 
the applicable standard of health care practice in this community in his care and 
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel? 
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes[_] No[_] 
If your answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 were "No" you are finished. Please 
sign the verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No. 3, then answer Question No. 4. 
Question No. 4: Was Mr. Byrne's breach of the standard of care a proximate 
cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death? 
Answer to Question No. 4: Yes[_] No[_] 
If you answered Questions Nos. 2 and 4, "No," you are finished. Please sign the 
Special Verdict Form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered 
Questions Nos. 2 and/or 4, "Yes," then continue to Question No. 5. 
Instruction for Question No. 5: You have reached this Question if you have 
found that either defendants Dr. Dille and/or Mr. Byrne breached the standard of care 
applicable to them and that breach of the standard of care proximately cause damage to 
the plaintiffs. In this Question, you are to apportion the fault between the parties on a 
percentage basis. As to each defendant that you found to have proximately caused 
damages to plaintiffs in answering Questions Nos. 2 and/or 4 "Yes," please determine 
the percentage of fault of that party and enter the percentage on the appropriate line 
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below. If you answered "No" to any of the above Questions, write a "O" or "Zero" as to 
that person. Your total percentages must equal 100 percent. 
Question No. 5: What percentage of fault (if any) do you assign to each of the 
following individuals: 
Answer to Question No. 5: 
To the Defendant, Clinton Dille, M.D. 
To the Defendant, Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 
TOTAL (must equal 100%) 
Please answer Question 6. 
__ % 
__ % 
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of damages plaintiffs sustained as a 
result of defendants' negligence? 
Answer to Question No. 6: We assess the plaintiffs' damages as follows: 
1. Vaughn Schmechel's economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30: 
$. ______ _ 
Vaughn Schmechel' s non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction 
No.30: 
Household services: 
$ _____ _ 
Services in the form of contribution to the family business: 
$ _____ _ 
Other non-economic damages: 
$ ______ _ 
2. Robert Lewis' non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30: 
$ ______ _ 
3. Kim Howard's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30: 
$ ______ _ 
4. Tamara Hall's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30: 
$ _______ _ 
TOTAL DAMAGES $ _______ _ 
DATED This _ day of October 2007. 
FOREPERSON 
Instruction No.~ 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you 
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the 
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then 
you will retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, 
the attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. 
At the outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic 
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be 
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you 
are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only 
after a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, and 
ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD 
and TAMARA HALL natural children 
of ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plain tiffs, 
VS. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. 
and JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatory as follows: 
Clark 
Deputy Cterk 
Question No. 1: Did defendant Clinton Dille, M.D., negligently fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice in this community in his care and treatment of 
Rosalie Schmechel? 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - I 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes[_] No [j(J 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, then do not answer Question No. 2 and 
proceed directly to Question No. 3. 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2. 
Question No. 2: Was Dr. Dille's breach of the standard of care a proximate cause of 
Mrs. Schmechel's death? 
Answer to Question No. 2: Yes[_] No[_] 
Please answer Question No. 3. 
Question No. 3: Did defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. negligently fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice in this community in his care and treatment of 
Mrs. Schmechel? 
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes[_] 
If your answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 were "No" you are finished. Please sign 
the verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No. 3, then answer Question No. 4. 
Question No. 4: Was Mr. Byrne's breach of the standard of care a proximate cause 
of Mrs. Schmechel' s death? 
Answer to Question No. 4: Yes[_] No[_] 
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If you answered Questions Nos. 2 and 4, "No," you are finished. Please sign the 
Special Verdict Form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered Questions 
Nos. 2 and/or 4, "Yes," then continue to Question No. 5. 
Instruction for Question No. 5: You have reached this Question if you have found 
that either defendants Dr. Dille and/or Mr. Byrne breached the standard of care applicable 
to them and that breach of the standard of care proximately cause damage to the plaintiffs. 
In this Question, you are to apportion the fault between the parties on a percentage basis. 
As to each defendant that you found to have proximately caused damages to plaintiffs in 
answering Questions Nos. 2 and/or 4 "Yes," please determine the percentage of fault of that 
party and enter the percentage on the appropriate line below. If you answered "No" to any 
of the above Questions, write a "O" or "Zero" as to that person. Your total percentages 
must equal 100 percent. 
Question No. 5: What percentage of fault (if any) do you assign to each of the 
following individuals: 
Answer to Question No. 5: 
To the Defendant, Clinton Dille, M.D. 
To the Defendant, Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 
TOTAL (must equal 100%) 
Please answer Question 6. 
__ % 
__ % 
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of damages plaintiffs sustained as a 
result of defendants' negligence? 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 3 
Answer to Question No. 6: We assess the plaintiffs' damages as follows: 
1. Vaughn Schmechel's economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30: 
$ ______ _ 
Vaughn Schmechel's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction 
No.30: 
Household services: 
$ ______ _ 
Services in the form of contribution to the family business: 
$ ______ _ 
Other non-economic damages: 
$ ______ _ 
2. Robert Lewis' non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30: 
$ ______ _ 
3. Kim Howard's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30: 
$ _______ _ 
4. Tamara Hall's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30: 
TOTAL DAMAGES 
DATED This )Oday of October 2007. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 4 
$ 
--------· 
$ _______ _ 
·~11!2_,t/t-__ 
FOREPERSON 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDI~I:~S-T~~~;~c::~;·;:: 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA 
HALL natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
JUDGMENT 
The above captioned case was tried to a jury from October 16 through October 30, 2007. 
Based on the verdict entered on October 30, 2007, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and 
DECREED that defendant Thomas J. Byrne. P.A., is awarded judgment against plaintiffs, together 
with costs as allowed by law upon timely submission of a cost bill. 
DATED this £ctay ofNovember, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of November, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
David Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Plaint/Ifs 
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
601 W. Bannock ST. 
PO Box2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, MD. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
Fax No.: (208)388-1300 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FfFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and : 
as Surviving Spouse and Personal : Case No. CV 05 4345 
. ' Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE : 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. : 
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA ; 
HALL, natmal children of ROSALIE : JUDGMENT 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, : 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
' ' CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN : 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho : 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and ; 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, : 
' 
' 
' Defendants. ' 
' 
' 
' 
This matter having been tried before a jury on October 16-30, 2007 and the jury having 
rendered its verdict in the Defendants' favor on October 30, 2007; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all claims against 
Defendants Clinton, Dille, M.D. and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute are DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE and JUDGMENT IS A WARDED in favor of Defendants Clinton, Dille, M.D. and 
JUDGMENT-! 
r 
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the Southern Idaho Pain Institute and against the Plaintiffs, together with such costs as allowed 
by law upon timely submission of a cost bill. 
DATED this 1_ day of November, 2007. 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, ) 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL- P. 1 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through her attorneys of record, Comstock and 
Bush and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and moves this Court, pursuant to Rufe 
59(a)(1 ),(3) and (7) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order granting a new 
trial. This Motion is made based upon the files and pleadings in this case, the 
proceedings at trial and before trial, and the Memorandum and Affidavit filed herewith. 
·n-
DATED THIS f S day of November, 2007. 
~~. 
Taylor M man, 
Attorney o Plaintiff 
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and as Surviving Spouse and Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
and ROBERT P LEWIS, KIM HOWARD ) 
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
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) 
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TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL- P. 1 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E. 
Comstock and Byron V. Foster, and respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This matter was tried before the Court and Jury commencing on October 16, 
2007, and concluding on October 30, 2007. The Jury rendered its Verdict pursuant to a 
Special Verdict on October 30, 2007. The Jury found no negligence and found in favor 
of the Defendants. Judgment was entered for Defendant Byrne on November 5, 2007. 
Judgment was entered for Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institute on 
November 9, 2007. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial is based upon a four-part argument that 
encompasses both pretrial proceedings and proceedings during trial. The first aspect of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial concerns the Court's refusal to allow the Plaintiffs' 
experts to offer opinion testimony regarding the Delegation of Services Agreement and 
how it pertains to the standard of care. The second aspect concerns the Court's ruling 
denying the Plaintiffs' motion to preclude Dr. Smith from testifying. Third, the Plaintiffs 
assert that the Court's ruling excluding the IDAPA regulations from the Jury's review 
was in error. The final aspect of the Plaintiffs' argument concerns the Court's decision 
to bifurcate "reckless" out of the jury instructions. 
MEMORANDUM IN SU PORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 2 
1. THE DELEGATION OF SERVICES AGREEMENT 
Plaintiff's first ground for meriting a new trial is based primarily on the prejudice 
that Plaintiffs suffered during the course of discovery prior to trial. The Plaintiffs 
requested in their Notice of Taking Video Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant Byrne, 
filed on May 1, 2006, that the Defendants bring a copy of the Delegation of Services 
Agreement to the deposition. When the Plaintiffs took the deposition of Defendant 
Byrne on May 18, 2006, the Defendants provided Plaintiffs a copy of a 2001 contract 
setting forth Defendant Byrne's initial employment contract and a 2004 Delegation of 
Services Agreement. At the deposition, counsel for Defendant Dille told the Plaintiffs on 
the record that in 2003, a Delegation of Services Agreement was not required under the 
IDAPA regulations. See, Amended Notice of Taking Video Deposition Duces Tecum of 
Thomas Byrne, with the relevant excerpt of the deposition, attached as Exhibit A to 
Affidavit of Byron Foster {"Foster Aff."). 
However, upon further review of the matter, Plaintiffs counsel learned that the 
IDAPA regulations did require a Delegation of Services Agreement in 2003, and also 
required that a physician overseeing a physician assistant is to keep a copy of the 
Delegation of Services Agreement on the premises for inspection by the Board of 
Medicine at any time. After discovering this requirement, the Plaintiffs requested that 
the Defendants produce the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement on June 29, 2006. 
See, Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, attached as Exhibit B to Foster Aff. The Defendants' 
response was that such an agreement did not exist. See, Defendant Thomas Byrne's 
Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents, attached as 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 3 
458 
Exhibit C to Foster Aff. The Plaintiffs then wrote a letter to the Defendants, again 
requesting that the Defendants supplement their discovery and provide a copy of the 
Delegation of Services Agreement. See, Letter to Counsel for the Defendants 
Regarding the Delegation of Services Agreement, attached as Exhibit D to Foster Aff. 
Less than one week before the trial, on October 11, 2007, the Defendants provided a 
copy of the Delegation of Services Agreement. See, Letter from Defendant to Plaintiffs' 
counsel dated October 11, 2007 Regarding Exhibit 276, the Delegation of Services 
Agreement, attached as Exhibit E to Foster Aff. The same day, the Plaintiffs requested 
to see a copy of the original Delegation of Services Agreement because the copy the 
Plaintiffs received was appeared to have a 2007 date written on it. See, Email from 
Plaintiffs paralegal to Counsel for the Defendant Regarding the Delegation of Services 
Agreement, attached as Exhibit E to Foster Affidavit. As explained below, Plaintiffs 
were severely prejudiced by this late disclosure. 
At trial, the Plaintiffs intended to have several experts offer opinions that the 
Delegation of Services Agreement, in part, set forth the standard of care because it 
outlines the parameters of a physician assistant's duties. If the Plaintiffs were enabled 
to show that the Defendants failed to follow the Delegation of Services Agreement, then 
the Plaintiffs could have also demonstrated to the jury that the Defendants failed to 
follow the standard of care imposed on them by law. The Court ruled that because the 
Plaintiffs' disclosures did not speak to this issue, the Plaintiffs had foreclosed their 
opportunity to make such an argument. Idaho Code§ 6-1012 specifically requires that 
in medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs must prove their case with direct expert 
testimony. In excluding the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts, the Court precluded the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 4 
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Plaintiffs from meeting the requirements of § 6-1012. The Court made this ruling 
despite Plaintiffs' arguments that the Plaintiffs received the Delegation of Services 
Agreement, the document that would have enabled the Plaintiffs to timely disclose what 
they anticipated their experts to testify to, on the eve of trial. Further prejudice ensued 
at trial when the Defendants were permitted to assert that the Delegation of Services 
Agreement was not the standard of care and that because Defendant Byrne and Dr. 
Dille had a history of working together and the plain language of the Delegation of 
Services Agreement could basically be ignored. 
The Defendants further commented that the Delegation of Services Agreement 
does not define the standard of care in their closing argument. This comment came 
after no expert at trial had opined that the Delegation of Services Agreement set forth 
the standard of care. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is inappropriate for a 
party to comment on evidence that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence. 
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993). The Court 
specifically ruled that experts could not testify that the Delegation of Services 
Agreement set forth the standard of care for a physician assistant. Accordingly, the 
Defendants took advantage of their late disclosure to the Plaintiffs' prejudice. Had the 
Defendants timely disclosed the Delegation of Services Agreement to the Plaintiffs, the 
Plaintiffs would have had an opportunity to address whether the Delegation of Services 
Agreement provided a basis for the standard of care imposed on the Defendants long 
before trial ever began. 
In addition, the Defendants stated that a Delegation of Services Agreement was 
not required by law in 2003, when in fact it was. At the deposition of Defendant Byrne, 
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counsel for Defendant Dille specifically stated, "with regard to the Delegation of 
Services Agreement, this was not in effect in 2003, as the Board of Medicine did not 
require them until 2004." Mr. Byrne then testified, "I think there was a-some 
documentation that was with the Board of Medicine, but not necessarily a Delegation of 
Services Agreement." The Plaintiffs, in part relying on this representation, did not 
pursue the Delegation of Services Agreement as a possible source for the standard of 
care. Due to the Defendants statements that an Agreement did not exist, the late 
disclosure of the Agreement, the Court's subsequent ruling that the Plaintiffs' experts 
could not testify that the Agreement provides a standard of care, and the statements by 
Defendants' counsel that no expert testified during trial that the Delegation of Services 
Agreement sets forth the standard of care, the Plaintiffs were precluded from developing 
the theory of their case and prejudiced by the Defendants' statements concerning the 
Delegation of Services Agreement. Whether this constitutes an irregularity in the 
proceedings of the trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a)(1 ), an unfair surprise pursuant to 
59(a)(3) or an error in law pursuant to IRCP 59(a)7; the result is the same, the Plaintiffs 
were prejudiced by the late disclosure and such prejudice amounts to a basis for 
Plaintiffs to have the opportunity to address this issue before the Court, and ultimately a 
jury. 
2. DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED 
Plaintiffs next move the Court, pursuant to IRCP 59(a) (1 ),(3) and/or (7) for a new 
trial based upon the Plaintiffs' belief that the Court erroneously allowed the testimony of 
Dr. Smith. In the Defendants' original disclosures pertaining to Dr. Smith, Dr. Smith had 
no opinion regarding Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death on a "more likely than not" basis. 
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See, Defendant Byrne's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, attached as Exhibit F to Foster 
Aff. In the Defendants' initial disclosures, Dr. Smith opined that other factors may have 
contributed to Mrs. Schmechel's death, but he did not state what the causes could have 
been. Because Dr. Smith did not seem to have an opinion, on a more likely than not 
basis, the Plaintiffs did not depose him. The Plaintiffs did so under the assumption that 
the Court would not allow an expert to testify unless the expert's opinion met the "more 
likely than not" standard. Again, shortly before trial, the Defendants provided the 
Plaintiffs with a supplemental expert disclosure that revealed Dr. Smith did actually have 
an opinion regarding Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death. Similar to the Delegation of 
Services Agreement, the Defendants disclosed Dr. Smith's opinion regarding Mrs. 
Schmechel's cause of death at the eleventh hour before trial unfairly surprising the 
Plaintiffs. See, Defendants' Supplemental Expert Disclosures, attached as Exhibit G to 
Foster Aff. The week before trial the Defendants revealed that Dr. Smith would testify, 
on a more likely than not basis that the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death was cardiac 
arrest. 
Due to the late disclosure, the Plaintiffs were unable to research and seek out an 
expert in cardiology that would provide testimony to counter that of Dr. Smith's. The 
purpose of Rule 26(e)(1 )(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is to prevent this type 
of prejudice and ensure that each party is entitled to a fair trial. That rule states, 
"(a) party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the response with 
respect to any question directly addressed to ... the identity of each person 
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on 
which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of the person's 
testimony." 
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I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1 )(B). While the Idaho Supreme Court has not defined what a 
"seasonable" disclosure is, the Court has given a good indication of what is not 
seasonable, and has expressed a strong policy disfavoring the same tactics of 
late disclosure employed by the Defendants in this case. The Court recently held 
that late disclosure regarding the opinions of defense experts in medical 
malpractice cases should not be accepted: 
"We do not look favorably upon discretionary decisions by district judges 
that encourage last-minute witness disclosure and unreasonably prevent 
plaintiffs from responding, particularly in complex medical malpractice 
cases where experts will be furnishing the jury with the bulk of the 
necessary, and often technical, facts." 
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). In the instant 
matter, the Court correctly determined that allowing Dr. Smith's testimony was within 
the Court's discretion. However, Plaintiffs were "stonewalled" by the Defendants 11 
days before trial when the Defendants finally disclosed Dr. Smith's opinion that Mrs. 
Schmechel's cause of death was cardiac arrest. See, Id. The Plaintiffs were not 
afforded an opportunity to depose Dr. Smith on this late opinion regarding the cause of 
death, the Plaintiffs did not have a full opportunity to prepare for cross-examination of 
Dr. Smith as to his newly expressed opinions, and the Plaintiffs did not have an 
opportunity to undertake additional discovery of their own to counter Dr. Smith's opinion. 
The Plaintiffs were in essence blindsided by Dr. Smith's opinions, as they altered the 
entire dynamics of the case. Accordingly, the supplementation of Dr. Smith's opinion 
was not seasonable, and his testimony should have been excluded at trial. 
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3. THE COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATLEY INSTRUCT THE JURY 
AND/OR ADMIT THE IDAPA REGULATIONS 
It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on the law. Woodburn v. Manco, 
137 Idaho 502,509 50 P.3d 997, 1004 (2002). The IDAPA regulations are the law that 
specifically pertains to the level of care imposed, by law, on physician assistants. This 
case involves the asserted violation of those regulations. Seemingly then, a jury sitting 
in the State of Idaho should be able to consider the standard of care the Idaho 
legislature authorized the Idaho State Board of Medicine to promulgate regarding 
physician assistants in Idaho. The Court did not instruct the jury on the IDAPA 
regulations, and in doing so, the Plaintiffs contend, ·committed error. 
Not only do the IDAPA regulations require that a physician must keep a copy of 
the Delegation of Services Agreement that the physician maintains with his or her 
physician assistant on the premises in which the physician practices, but the IDAPA 
regulations set forth specific requirements for physician assistants. They are in fact, the 
"Rules For the Licensure of Physician Assistants." IDAPA § 22.01 .03.000 (2003). On 
cross examination, Mr. Byrne even admitted that the IDAPA regulations are the law that 
governs the duties of a physician assistant. Mr. Byrne further conceded that the 
regulations require a Delegation of Services Agreement to be in place, and that if Mr. 
Byrne, as a physician assistant, does not practice within the bounds of that agreement, 
then he practices below the standard of care that is imposed on him by law. 
While the Court permitted the Plaintiffs to use the IDAPA regulations to cross 
examine Mr. Byrne, the Court reserved ruling on their admissibility. At the conclusion of 
trial, when the parties and the Court addressed jury instructions, the Court gave its 
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ruling that it would not admit the IDAPA regulations for the jury's review. Plaintiffs 
respectfully contend this was in error. In Sanchez v. Galey, the Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized that statutes and administrative regulations may define the applicable 
standard of care owed. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 
(1986). In the present matter, the IDAPA regulations clearly set forth the required 
standard of conduct for physician assistants, as they were designed to "govern the 
activities of persons employed as physician assistants by persons licensed to practice 
medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery in Idaho." IDAPA 
22.01 .03.000 (2003). In fact, § 22.01 .03.030.03 of the IDAPA regulations is titled 
"Practice Standards" and explicitly states: 
"A physician assistant shall not write prescriptions ... diagnose and manage 
major illnesses or conditions or manage the health care of unstable or 
acutely ill or injured patients unless those conditions are minor ... " 
§ 22.01 .03.028 of the IDAPA regulations also defines and limits the "Scope of Practice" 
for a physician assistant in Idaho. That section provides that a physician assistant may 
"manage the health care of the stable chronically ill patient in accordance with the 
medical regimen initiated by the supervising physician." The IDAPA regulations do not 
permit the physician assistant to initiate his or her own medical regimen for the patient. 
Accordingly, the IDAPA regulations clearly define what the standard of care for 
physician assistants in Idaho is in the "Practice Standards" and "Scope of Practice" 
sections of the regulations. 
As the court recognized in Sanchez, the legislature has a particular intent in 
enacting certain statutes that give the Board of Medicine the authority to adopt 
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regulations. The legislature has done so in Idaho Code § 54-1806(2) to ensure that 
patients are protected from the unauthorized or negligent care of physician assistants. 
The Court's holding in Sanchez reflects that the intent of the legislature in enacting 
certain statutes, such as § 54-1806(2), is to assure patient safety, and Courts are in the 
best position to ensure that the legislature's intent is upheld by allowing instructions 
regarding statutory or regulation violations. It is the Plaintiffs' contention that a jury 
would find, had they had the opportunity to review the IDAPA regulations and discern 
the appropriate standard of care for a physician assistant, that Mr. Byrne was in 
violation of the regulations and corresponding standard of care. It is the Court's 
obligation to ensure that the jury is instructed on the law. When the Court precluded 
the jury from considering the IDAPA regulations, it deprived the Plaintiffs of their 
entitlement to have the jury so instructed. Additionally, by delineating the IDAPA 
regulations from the instructions to the jury, the Court failed to adequately instruct the 
jury on the law. 
4. "RECKLESS" SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN BIFURCATED IN THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
As the Court is aware, the Plaintiffs submitted two trial briefs regarding the 
definition of "reckless" and how the jury should be instructed with respect to the 
Defendants' alleged recklessness. The Court accepted the Plaintiffs' definition of 
"reckless." However, the Court made the determination to bifurcate the instructions so 
that the jury would not be instructed on whether the Defendants' conduct was reckless 
unless the jury first determined that the Plaintiffs were entitled to damages exceeding 
the statutory cap for damages. 
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When considered as a whole, the jury instructions must fairly and adequately 
present the issues of the case and state the applicable law." Perry v. Magic Valley 
Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000). Reversible error occurs 
if an instruction misleads the jury or prejudices a party. Id. Citing, Lawton v. City of 
Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 462, 886 P.2d 330, 338 (1994). Plaintiffs contend the Court's 
decision to bifurcate the instructions prejudiced them at trial. 
The complications that stem from the Court's determination to bifurcate the 
reckless instruction are two-fold. First, the Court allowed Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Arthur 
Lipman, to testify that in his opinion, Defendant Byrne's course of treatment for Mrs. 
Schmechel was reckless. The Plaintiffs focused much their questioning of Dr. Lipman 
to his determination that Mr. Byrne was reckless in his treatment of Mrs. Schmechel. 
Thus, unknowing of what the Court's ultimate instruction to the jury would be regarding 
the Defendants' recklessness, the Plaintiffs elicited substantial testimony to the jury 
regarding the Defendants' recklessness. Such testimony, without a corresponding 
instruction likely confused or misled the jury. 
The second complication arose because the jury was not given the option before 
rendering a verdict that the Defendants' conduct was such a severe departure from the 
standard of care that it could have constituted reckless behavior. Recklessness is a 
characterization of the degree of departure from the standard of care, and the Plaintiffs 
presented significant evidence that the Defendants' breach of the standard of care 
constituted recklessness. In preventing the Plaintiffs from arguing recklessness in the 
closing argument and in precluding the jury from even considering whether the 
Defendants' conduct was reckless, the Court in effect, severed the Plaintiffs' case and 
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prevented the jury from making their own determination on whether the Defendants' 
conduct was reckless. In medical malpractice cases, there is no requirement that the 
trier of fact must first find that a Defendant is negligent before they can find that the 
Defendant was reckless. It is entirely possible for the trier of fact to find that that a 
Defendant was reckless without ever reaching the question of whether the Defendant 
was negligent. t is also important to recognize the issue from the juror's perspective. A 
juror listening to the testimony in this case heard evidence that the Defendants' conduct 
was reckless. Upon retiring for deliberations, without a corresponding reckless 
instruction, all of that testimony becomes meaningless. Not only is the juror prevented 
from considering why the reckless testimony may have been important, but the jury will 
second guess the testimony, and discount the credibility of the witness and the 
Plaintiffs' overall case, because it has no bearing on their ultimate determination. 
Accordingly, the Court's ruling on bifurcating the reckless instruction, which 
effectively prevented the jury from even considering whether the Defendants' conduct 
was reckless constituted an irregularity in the proceedings of trial, or in the alternative, 
an error in law unfairly prejudicing the Plaintiffs. I.R.C.P. 59(a) (1) and (7). Such 
irregularity and/or error affected a substantial right of the Plaintiffs and mandates a new 
trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a)7. See, Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd., 127 Idaho 
565, 575, 903 P.2d 730, 740 (1995). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs seek a new trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a)(1 ), (3) and (7) because of 
irregularities, surprises, prejudices, and errors in law that were made to the Plaintiffs' 
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detriment. The Plaintiffs have suffered prejudice from the Defendants' failure to 
disclose and late disclosure of evidence that was material to the case, such as the 
Delegation of Services Agreement and Dr. Smith's opinion regarding Mrs. Schmechel's 
cause of death. The Plaintiffs also contend that the jury was not properly instructed on 
the law when the Court did not incorporate the IDAPA regulations into the instructions. 
In addition, the Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the Court's decision to bifurcate the 
issue of recklessness from the closing arguments and from the jury instructions. While 
understanding that is difficult to formulate a set of instructions for the jury that coincides 
with the evidence presented at trial until after all the evidence has been presented, the 
Plaintiffs contend that the Court's decision to separate the reckless instruction after the 
trial concluded prejudiced the Plaintiffs during their case presentation. Bifurcating the 
reckless instruction out until or if the jury's verdict exceeded the statutory cap had the 
effect of unfairly dissecting the Plaintiffs' case during the jury's deliberations. 
Plaintiffs are mindful that the evidentiary and procedural determinations the Court 
rendered before and during trial were intricate and demanding, to say the least. 
However, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they are entitled to a fair trial, free from 
prejudice and irregularities that affected the outcome of this trial. In that light, the 
Plaintiffs move this Court for a new trial to ensure that substantial justice is done. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS )V/~f November, 2007. 
---
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Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dille, M.D. 
and Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
BY-~ 
__________ .. ___ .. ,,.D,~?Ul'Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and: 
as Surviving Spouse and Personal : 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE : 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT : 
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA : 
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE : 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, ' 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
' 
. ' CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN : 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho : 
' corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and: 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, : 
' 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 05 4345 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, 
M.O. AND SOUTHERN IOAHO PAIN · 
INSTITUTE'$ RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
Defendants Clinton Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute respond to and 
oppose Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter was tried to a Twin Falls county jury from October 16, 2007 through 
October 30, 2007. After considering the evidence and law, the jury returned a verdict in 
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the Defendants' favor finding they did not breach the applicable standard of care. 
Plaintiffs now ask the Court to overturn the jury's verdict and grant them a new trial on 
several grounds. While Plaintiffs assert at least four separate issues justifying a new 
trial, all of Plaintiffs' arguments arise out of discretionary rulings the Court made during 
the course of the trial. The Court properly recognized these issues as issues requiring 
exercise of its discretion and through an exercise of reason, properly ruled on the issues 
at trial. Although Plaintiffs now complain about several of the Court's discretionary 
rulings, they have failed to establish the Court abused its discretion in making those 
rulings. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion should be denied and the jury's verdict should 
stand. 
II. ARGUMENT 
· A. Plaintiffs Cannot Meet the Legal Standard that Would Justify Granting a 
New Trial.· 
The trial court is vested with wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for a 
new trial and a trial court's decision will not be overturned unless the trial court 
"manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it." Jones v. Panhandle Distributors, 
Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 755, 792 P.2d 315, 320 (1990) quoting Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 
759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). 
Plaintiffs seek a new trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) 
subparts (1 ), (3), and (7). To succeed on their motion, Rule 59(a)(1) requires Plaintiffs 
to establish an "irregularity in the proceeding of the court." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1 ). In turn, 
Rule 59(a)(3) requires Plaintiffs to establish an "accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3). Finally, Rule 59(a)(7) 
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requires Plaintiffs to establish an "error of law, occurring at trial." I.R.C.P 59(a)(7). 
Plaintiffs cannot meet any of these standards. 
The Court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for new 
trial and a trial court's decision will not be overturned unless the trial court manifestly 
abused its discretion. Craig Johnson Const., LLC v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 
Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006). fdaho appellate courts review the decision 
to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Warren 
v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003). On appeal the trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a new trial will not be disturbed absent a showing of manifest 
abuse. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526,529, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2003). 
When considering whether to grant a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1 ), 
. plaintiffs must establish that an. irregularity in the proceedings of the Court, jury or 
adverse party prevented plaintiffs from receiving a fair trial. A Court's determination of 
whether such an irregularity prevented plaintiff from having a fair trial is a matter of 
discretion. Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 440, 757 
P.2d 695, 703 (Ct. App.,1988) 
A motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3) requires a showing that the alleged 
accident or surprise is one that "ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3). Hughes v. State, Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement, 129 Idaho 558, 
562, 929 P.2d 120, 124 (1996). Further, the moving party must establish that such 
accident or surprise caused prejudice. See Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 
821 P.2d 973 (1991). 
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Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7), the trial court may grant a new trial for errors in law 
that occurred during trial, but only if such error affects a substantial right of the moving 
party. Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 345, 986 P.2d 996, 1011 
(1999). The trial court is vested with "wide discretion" to deny a motion for new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) when the substantial rights of the movant are not affected and 
that party is riot entitled to a new trial as a matter of right. Craig Johnson Const., LLC, 
142 Idaho at 801, 134 P .3d at 652. 
B. If the Ultimate Care Defendants' Provided to Mrs. Schmechel Complied 
With the Standard of Care, Plaintiffs Arguments Focusing on Collateral 
Issues Must Be Rejected. 
At the heart of this case is the jury's finding that the Defendants were not 
negligent in their care and treatmentof Mrs. Schmechel. Plaintiffs' arguments focusing 
on the IDAPAs, 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement and reckless jury instruction 
are red herrings. If the actual medical treatment provided to Mrs. Schmechel compliecl 
with the standard of care, the substance of the IDAPAs, 2003 Delegation of Services 
Agreement and whether or not a reckless jury instruction was issued are of little, if any, 
relevance. 
Through their arguments on collateral issues, Plaintiffs attempt to draw the 
Court's attention away from the fact that they failed to prove their prima facia medical 
negligence case to the jury. The fact remains that after listening to weeks of testimony 
from both lay witnesses and experts and reviewing numerous exhibits, the jury was 
convinced the Defendants' care of Mrs. Schmechel was reasonable. Even assuming for 
the sake of argument the IDAPAs or 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement may have 
been violated (which Defendants vigorously continue to deny), if Mr. Byrne ultimately 
provided adequate care, then the Defendants could not be found liable for any violation 
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of these standards because the actual medical treatment was still reasonable and 
because these alleged peripheral IDAPA and Delegation of Services Agreement 
breaches did not proximately cause any injury. Ultimately, the arguments regarding the 
Delegation of Services Agreement and the IDAPAs are equivalent to an-argument over 
who should be steering a ship, the captain or the first mate, which ignores the jury's 
conclusion that regardless of who was steering the ship, it was steered in a reasonable, 
non-negligent manner. 
It is against this backdrop that Plaintiffs arguments must be considered. Plaintiffs 
are dissatisfied with the jury's verdict, but they fail to offer any satisfactory reason to 
disturb the jury's ultimate conclusion that the Defendants' care and treatment of Mrs. 
Schmechel did not violate the standard of care. 
C. The Court Properly Excluded Expert Testimony Relating to the 2003 
Delegation of Services Agreement. 
Plaintiffs complain they were improperly precluded from eliciting expert testimony 
in an attempt to establish the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement set forth Mr. 
Byrne's standard of care. The Court made clear, however, that Plaintiffs could call a 
rebuttal expert on this topic (as well as the IDAPAs), but Plaintiffs chose not to do so. 
Plaintiffs also make much of the fact the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement was 
inadvertently produced late in the litigation due to the fact it was not discovered in Mr. 
Byrne's files until after the discovery d.eadfine had technically passed. 1 
Plaintiffs fail to mention, however, that Mr. Byrne had produced the 2004 
Delegation of Services Agreement as well as Mr. Byrne's job description, which 
1 All parties worked diligently to assure full exchange of information up to the eve of trial. In fact, Plaintiffs 
were supplementing their document production as late as September 14, 2007 and producing documents 
at that time that had been requested as early as April 17, 2006. 
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contained nearly the exact same language concerning Mr. Byrne's scope of practice as 
the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement. (See Trial Exhibits 40 and 233; Hippler 
Aff. at Exhibit B). Even though both of these documents were available to Plaintiffs 
since early 2006, the Plaintiffs did not disclose, at any time before trial, that their experts 
held any opinions that Mr. Byrne had acted beyond the scope of his practice in seeing 
Mrs. Schmechel and modifying her pain care regimen without first consulting Dr. Dille 
based upon Idaho law or Mr. Byrne's job description. Indeed, a review of Plaintiffs' 
experts, Dr. Lipman, Dr. Lordon and Mr. Keller's, depositions and the documents 
Plaintiffs provided them prior to the depositions demonstrates these experts were never 
provided Mr. Byrne's job description, the 2004 Delegation of Services Agreement and 
never reviewed the IDAPAs. Notwithstanding this fact, they opined, both at their 
depositions and at trial, that Mr .. Byrne. did · not violate Idaho law in prescribing 
medication to Mrs. Schmechel and modifying her pain care regimen. (See Hippler Aff. at 
Ex. C, (Deposition of Dr. Lipman) p. 191, II. 8-16 and p. 237, II. 3-6, Ex. D (Deposition of 
Mr. Keller) p. 55, L. 19- p. 56, L. 3, Ex. E (Trial Testimony of Mr. Keller) p. 51, II. 15-22, 
and Ex. F (Trial Testimony of Dr. Lordon) p. 66, I. 8- p. 67, I. 6). 
Plaintiffs also assert they relied upon representations by Dr. Dille's and the 
Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's counsel at Mr. Byrne's deposition that a Delegation of 
Services Agreement was not required by law in 2003.2 Plaintiffs were not entitled to rely 
upon legal interpretations set forth in an objection by opposing counsel at a deposition 
and were instead obligated to do their own research on this issue. Once Plaintiffs 
2 In 2003 the Board of Medicine only required that there be on site a written agreement outlining the 
understanding of the relationship between the PA and supervising physician. See IDAPA § 22.01 .03.04 
(2003), Based upon the information known at the time of Mr. Byrne's deposition, it was believed his 2001 
job description fulfilled this requirement. (See Hippler Aff. at~ 3). 
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researched the issue by reviewing the applicable IDAPAs for themselves, which they 
should have reasonably done before Mr. Byrne's deposition, they specifically requested 
a 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement from Defendants. After further research of 
Mr. Byrne's files, a 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement was found and immediately 
produced to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were free to research the IDAPAs at any time and 
specifically request a 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement prior to Mr. Byrne's 
deposition or even serve a request for admission confirming one did not exist. They 
chose not to do so and only researched the IDAPAs in the days immediately prior to 
trial. This is not Defendants' fault and is certainly not grounds to grant a new trial. 
Indeed, Plaintiffs came to Mr. Byrne's deposition with the 2006 IDAPAs and tried to 
question Mr. Byrne on this version of the IDAPAs. Dr; Dille's counsel properly objected 
to. the foundation of the questions and noted that the regulations from which Plaintiffs 
were asking questions were not in effect in 2003. The particular portions of IDAPA 
regulations the Plaintiffs attempted to use at the 2006 deposition had an effective date 
of 2004. (Hippler Aff. at ,r 4 and Ex. A, p. 95, II. 5-22). Plaintiffs should have researched 
the regulations and been prepared at the deposition to question Mr. Byrne on the 
regulations in effect in 2003. 
This Court noted the similarity in the language in the job description and 
Delegation of Services Agreements in sustaining the Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' 
questioning of Dr. Lordon concerning the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement. 
(Hippler Aff. at Ex. F (Trial Testimony of Dr. Lordon) at p. 39, LL. 14 -L. 21) Therefore, 
the Plaintiffs were fully aware of the "the nature of the inquiry and the circumstances 
sur~ounding" the language contained in 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement and 
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should have supplemented their expert disclosures if they intended to pursue this theory 
at trial. (Id.). Indeed, Plaintiffs did not even supplement their expert disclosures in the 
days before trial to indicate their experts held such opinions. 
Moreover, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to cross examine both Mr. Byrne and Dr. 
Dille at trial with the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement. Plaintiffs elicited 
testimony from both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille relating to the purpose and scope of the 
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement and displayed portions of the Agreement to the 
jury. (Hippler Aff. at Ex. G (October 19, 2007 Trial Testimony of Mr. Byrne) p. 8, I. 19- p. 
9, I. 9, and Ex. I (Trial Testimony of Dr. Dille) p. 58, I. 6-p. 62, I. 15). Plaintiffs were free 
to, and did in fact, question both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille regarding whether or not the 
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement established the standard of care for Mr. Byrne's 
practice at the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute.3 
Likewise, Plaintiffs were also free to, and in fact did, argue in closing that the 
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement established Mr. Byrne's standard of care and 
that he breached it. Defendants then properly responded to this argument in their 
closing remarks. Defendants did not, as Plaintiffs assert, "misrepresent or 
mischaracterize the evidence."4 (Memorandum in Support at 5). Plaintiffs' reliance on 
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993) is misplaced. In 
Raudebaugh, a criminal case, the Idaho Supreme Court actually failed to reach the 
issue of whether a prosecutor's comments describing the manner of a murder victim's 
3 It is also important to note that despite being unaware that Plaintiffs were going to put the scope of Mr. 
Byrne's authority under the Delegation of Services Agreement and the IDAPAs at issue during the trial, 
Defendants were also not allowed to have their experts testify regarding the IDAPAs or the Delegation of 
Services Agreement in response to Plaintiffs' questioning of Defendants with these documents, based 
upon Plaintiffs' disclosure objection, which the Court sustained. 
4 Plaintiffs did no! object to Defendants' closing arguments, however, and therefore waived any objection 
they had to any argument made during closing arguments. Therefore, even if the objection is valid, it is 
deemed to have been waived. Quick v. Crane. 111 Idaho 759. 782, 727 P.2d 1167, 121 O ( 1986)]. 
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fundamental error. Raudebaugh had no bearing on this case at all. 
D. The Court Properly Excluded the IDAPAs from Evidence and Properly 
Instructed the Jury Concerning the IDAPAs. 
In a related argument, the Plaintiffs assert they were prejudiced by the Court's 
refusal to admit the Idaho IDAPAs relating to Physician Assistants into evidence so the 
jury could review them while deliberating. The Court allowed Plaintiffs to freely cross 
examine the Defendants with the IDAPAs and allowed Plaintiffs to display them to the 
jury and offer argument relating to the IDAPAs, however. 
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs' contentio.n that "[t]he Court did not instruct the jury 
on the IDAPA regulations" is unfounded and a simple review of the final jury instructions 
refutes this argument. In Instruction No. 28, the Court instructed the jury: 
You are instructed that the court takes judicial notice of the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act, § 22.01,03 (2003), entitled "Rules for the 
Licensure of Physician Assistants." The rules were in effect in 2003. 
Plaintiffs proposed an instruction that commented on the facts of this particular case, 
which the Court properly rejected in favor of a general instruction regarding the IDAPA's 
· existence and their legal effect. In giving this instruction, moreover, the Court 
specifically licensed Plaintiffs to freely show the jury the IDAPAs and argue their 
interpretation of these regulations. Plaintiffs chose not to do so in their closing 
argument; this was their own tactical choice. 
Further, the Court gave Plaintiffs great latitude in using the IDAPAs to cross 
examine both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille and in displaying them to the jury. (Hippler Aff. at 
Ex. H (October 24, 2007 Trial Testimony of Mr. Byrne) p. 100, I. 25 - p. 106, I. 12 and 
Ex. I (Trial Testimony of Dr. Dille) p. 25, I. 25 - p. 62, I. 15). The Plaintiffs had ample 
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opportunity to present their IDAPA theory to the jury through effective cross-examination 
and argument. 
Just because the actual IDAPAs themselves did not go back with the jury does 
not mean the Plaintiffs were prejudiced in any way. Rather, the Court was justifiably 
concerned that the IDAPAs would confuse and/or mislead the jury. The IDAPA's actual 
meaning was hotly debated by counsel throughout trial and sending a complex set of 
legal regulations back to the jury would only serve to confuse them and invite them to 
interpret the law for themselves rather than following the Court's instructions on the law. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs did not prove the necessary elements to establish a violation 
of the IDAPAs in question and, in turn, to establish any negligence per se.5 Plaintiffs 
cite Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1242 (1986) to support their contention 
that statutes and administrative regulations may be used to define the applicable 
standard of care. Sanchez and many later cases including Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 
393,395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001) make clear, however, several elements must be 
met before a statute or regulations can be used to establish the standard of care and 
trigger the doctrine of negligence per se. 
Negligence per se occurs where a person violates an ordinance or state law. 
Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at1078. A claim of negligence per se requires a 
plaintiff to prove: (1) the statute or regulation clearly defines the standard of conduct; (2) 
the statute or regulation was intended to prevent the harm caused by defendant's act or 
omission; (3) plaintiff is a person of the class the statute or regulation was designed to 
protect; and (4) the violation must be a proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged injury. 
5 It is further unclear whether the doctrine of negligence per se is applicable in a medical negligence case 
based upon professional malpractice and the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 that 
require plaintiffs to prove through their case through the direct expert testimony and opinion. 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL -10 
480 
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308,311 (2005). Negligence 
per se is a question of law for the court. Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at1078. 
Negligence per se is no different from ordinary negligence. Id. Neglig~nce per se only 
acts to remove duty and breach from the jury. Id. (citing Slade v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 
119 Idaho 482,489,808 P.2d 401,408 (1991)). 
In Ahles v. Tabor, the district court held that the defendant was negligent per se 
for violating I.C. § 49-633 for passing the plaintiff's vehicle on the right side and causing 
a subsequent collision. Ahles, 136 Idaho at 394, 34 P.3d at 1077. On appeal, the 
Idaho Supreme Court addressed each of the four requirements of negligence per se 
and determined the statute did not allow for application of the doctrine of negligence per 
.. se .. .The Ahles court found that elements 2 and 3 were met as the statute was intended 
, to protect motorists and plaintiff felt within the protected category. However, the court 
held. "the standard of conduct described in I .C. § 49-633, . . . is far from clear and 
· requires statutory interpretation including consideration of problematic definitions of 
terms used in the statute." Id. 136 Idaho at 396, 34 P.3d at 1079. 
The Ahles court further held there were numerous questions as to certain terms 
in the statute that were subject to interpretation, and that "[a]II of these questions add to 
the complexity of the statute and show that the standard of conduct derived from 
interpreting the statute is less than clear and not easily ascertained or applied." Id. As 
such, the Ahles court held that J.C. § 49-633 did not satisfy the test with regard to the 
"description of a clear standard of conduct. Accordingly, the alleged violation of the 
statute in this case cannot be deemed negligence per se." Id. 
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Here, IDAPA sections 22.01 .03 et seq. are far from clear and fail to define many 
key terms. Specifically, IDAPA section 22.01 .03.28 SCOPE OF PRACTICE, indicates 
various items which a physician assistant may perform if included in the Delegation of 
Services Agreement including, "Diagnose and manage minor illnesses or conditions" 
and "manage the health care of the stable chronically ill patient in accordance with the 
medical regimen initiated by the supervising physician." IDAPA §§ 22.01.03.28.03 and 
22.01 .03.28.04. 
The IDAPAs do not define "minor illnesses or conditions" or "major illnesses or 
conditions" or what constitutes "chronically ill." The IDAPAs do not define the term 
"manage." As such, what constitutes a minor or major illness or condition is ambiguous 
and left to interpretation. In addition what constitutes managed care of a stable 
chronically ill patient is left to interpretation. If Mrs. Schmechel's chronic pain was a 
·. minor condition (as testified to by Mr. Byrne) the IDAPA Regulations would allow Mr. 
Byrne to diagnose and manage such condition. 
As stated above, the fourth requirement to find that violation of a statute or 
regulation equates to negligence per se is that "the violation must have been the 
proximate cause of the injury." Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P .3d at 1078. Plaintiffs did 
not meet this requirement as Dr. Dille testified at trial, that with regard to Mr. Byrne's 
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel, he would not have done anything differently. (Hippler Aff. 
at Ex. I (Trial Testimony of Dr. Dille) p. 75, I. 25- p. 76, I. 11). Because Dr. Dille would 
not have changed the treatment provided by Mr. Byrne to Mrs. Schmechel, plaintiffs did 
not establish that any alleged breach of the IDAPAs or Delegation of Services 
Agreement was the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. Furthermore, as 
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discussed in Section A, above, to find a breach of the standard of care, the Plaintiffs 
had to prove the medical care provided was unreasonable or negligent. Here, by 
answering question No. 1 and question No. 3 -of the special verdict form "No," the jury 
necessarily concluded that it was reasonable for Mrs. Schmechel to be prescribed 
Methadone the way that it was prescribed and the medical treatment was not 
unreasonable. 
In this case, the !DAPAs in question are subject to interpretation and do not 
clearly define a required standard of conduct. Further, because testimony at trial 
indicated Dr. Dille would not have changed Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. 
Schmechel, Plaintiffs did not establish any alleged breach of the IDAPAs was the 
proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. Moreover, the Plaintiffs did not prove that 
the medical care provided, regardless of who provided it, was negligent. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs did not establish the IDAPAs clearly defined a required 
standard of conduct for Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille, nor did Plaintiffs establish that any 
alleged violation of the IDAPAs was the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
As such, Plaintiffs did not meet the necessary requirements to establish negligence per 
se and the Court properly declined to instruct the jury with specific language from the 
IDAPAs or admit the IDAPAs into evidence for the jury to review during their 
deliberations. 
The Plaintiffs suffered no prejudice through the Court's refusal to admit the 
IDAPAs and send them back to the jury. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Alexander v. 
Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc, when a party is allowed to read a safety code to the jury 
and question witnesses with the document the complaining party does not suffer any 
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prejudice. Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 
Miss. 1984) ("Secondly, no substantial right of Alexander's was affected by the failure to 
admit the Code as an exhibit because the relevant sections had already been read and 
shown to the jury.") 
Finally, as discussed above, if the ultimate care Mr. Byrne rendered to Mrs. 
Schmechel was not negligent, than any alleged violation of the IDAPAs is moot because 
any alleged violation of the IDAPA did not result in Mrs. Schmechel receiving 
substandard medical care. The heart of this case is the care and treatment Mrs. 
Schmechel received, which the jury unanimously found was not negligent as is reflected 
by the juror's unanimous verdict answering questions No. 1 and No. 3 of the special 
verdict form "No." 
E. The Court Properly Admitted Dr; Smith's Testimony. 
Plaintiffs assert Dr. Smith's opinion concerning Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death 
was not sufficiently disclosed prior to trial and that they were somehow prejudiced by · 
the Dr. Smith's testimony. Dr. Smith's did not fully develop his cause of death opinion 
until he reviewed the deposition of Shaiyenne Anton, the deputy coroner who 
investigated the scene of Mrs. Schmechel's death and concluded Mrs. Schmechel died 
while she was awake. Based in large part upon Ms. Anton's determination who was 
charged with determining the manner of death, Dr. Smith was able to conclude a 
sudden cardiac event, such as a cardiac arrhythmia, likely caused Mrs. Schmechef's 
death. See Trial Testimony of Dr. Smith. Due to the number of depositions that were 
required in this case and Ms. Anton's schedule, her deposition, unfortunately, was not 
taken until September 5, 2007. The parties tried diligently to schedule depositions in 
this matter, but due to various scheduling difficulties, some depositions, including Ms. 
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Byrne's Counsel). Dr. Smith then reviewed the deposition and his expert disclosure 
was supplemented on October 4, 2007 as soon as feasible after Dr. Smith 
communicated his revised opinion to Defendants' counsel.6 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' insinuation, Defendants were not attempting to "sand bag" 
or "stonewall" them with a late expert disclosure. Rather, Defendants were simply 
complying with their discovery obligations and supplementing their expert disclosures as 
soon as they learned Dr. Smith had slightly expanded his earlier disclosed opinion 
regarding cause of death. This was not malicious. Instead, it was in compliance with 
Rules, and Defendants had plenty of time to depose him if they wished and Plaintiffs did 
prepare an effective cross examine of Dr. Smith concerning his cause of death opinions. 
If Plaintiffs had wished to depose Dr. Smith prior to trial, Defendants would have 
accommodated this request. Instead, Plaintiffs chose not to depose any· of the 
Defendants experts. 
Plaintiffs cite Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006) for the 
proposition that a trial court should not exercise its discretion in a manner that 
prejudices one party or the other. Plaintiffs ignore, however, a later passage in 
Edmunds, which is directly on point here. In Edmunds, the Idaho Supreme Court noted: 
Second, Idaho law specifically contemplates that expert testimony can 
change after the initial disclosure. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(e)(1)(B) requires that litigants supplement discovery responses as to 
"the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at 
trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the 
substance of the person's testimony." This Court has held that_ this rule 
"unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement responses to 
6 All parties provided supplemental expert disclosures up to the eve of trial. Plaintiffs provided 
supplemental briefing regarding expert opinions on October 15, 2007. Plaintiffs last supplemental expert 
disclosure was on October 5, 2007. 
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discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert's 
testimony where the initial responses have been rejected, modified, 
expanded upon or otherwise altered in some manner." Clark v. Klein, 137 
Idaho 154, 157, 45 P.3d 810, 813 (2002) (quoting Radmer v. Ford Motor 
Co., 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897 (1991)) (emphasis added). In fact, 
litigants are subject to sanctions, including the exclusion of expert 
testimony, when they have failed to supplement an expert's opinion. See, 
e.g., Radmer, 120 Idaho at 91,813 P.2d at 902. 
Edmunds, 142 Idaho 867,874, 136 P.3d 338,345 (2006) (emphasis in original). 
In other words, had Defendants not supplemented Dr. Smith's expert disclosure, 
which put Plaintiffs on notice of his revised opinions, it is possible the Court might have 
precluded him from opining regarding Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death.7 Instead, in 
compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants supplemented Dr. Smith's 
disclosure prior to trial and the Court properly allowed Dr. Smith to testify regarding Mrs. 
Schmechel's cause of death. It is not the Defendants' fault Ms. Anton's deposition 
could not be arranged until·· late in the process due· in large part to the Plaintiffs' 
counsel's schedule and the joint cooperation that all counsel afforded each other in this 
case. 
Finally, Dr. Smith's cause of death opinion only related to the issue of proximate 
cause-an issue the jury did not reach. The jury instead found the Defendants did not 
breach the standard of care. Therefore, allowing Dr. Smith's opinion concerning cause 
of death was, at the most, harmless error that did not affect the jury's ultimate verdict or 
prejudice the Plaintiffs in any way. 
7 Just as the Court properly excluded Dr. Lordon's undisclosed opinion concerning the application of the 
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement (See Section II. A, above). 
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F. The Court Properly Bifurcated the Issue of Recklessness from the Jury's 
Initial Determination of Liability and Damages. 
The instructions to the jury must be read as a whole and any review of the 
instructions "is limited to a determination of whether the instructions. as a whole, fairly 
and adequately present the issues and state the law." Garcia v. Windley, 164 P.3d 819, 
822 -823 (2007). Plaintiffs offer two arguments relating to the Court's bifurcation of the 
issue of recklessness from the jury's consideration of liability and damages. Plaintiffs 
first argue that the jury may have been confused because they questioned their expert, 
Dr. Lipman, concerning his opinion of whether or not Mr. Byrne acting recklessly in his 
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel. 
Plaintiffs were free, of course, to question their expert on any disclosed topic they 
wished relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit. The fact Plaintiffs choice to focus 
some of their questions on the issue of recklessness was entirely their decision. By that 
point in the trial, Defendants had expressed their opposition to instructing the jury on 
recklessness, and Plaintiffs bore the risk of confusing the jury with their questioning if 
the Court decided not to instruct the jury on recklessness. Just because the Plaintiffs 
proposed a recklessness instruction did not mean the Court would ultimately instruct the 
jury on that issue. The Court properly weighed the evidence submitted and the law and 
determined the issue of recklessness only became relevant if liability was found and 
damages awarded in excess of the statutory non-economic damages cap. 
Second, Plaintiffs appear to argue the jury could have found Mr. Byrne reckless 
"without ever reaching the question of whether the Defendant was negligent." 
(Memorandum in Support at p. 13). This argument defies common sense as well as the 
state of the law. The face of Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction even makes it clear 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.O. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL· 17 
487 
"reckless" conduct is conduct bearing a higher degree of culpability than negligent 
conduct. Plaintiffs' proposed instruction on recklessness stated: 
The words "reckless conduct" when used in these instructions and when 
appiied to the allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary 
negligence. The words mean acts or omissions under circumstances 
where the actor knew or should have known that the acts or omissions not 
only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high 
degree of probability that such harm would actually result. 
(Emphasis added). 
Under Plaintiffs' own definition of recklessness, if Mr. Byrne was not negligent, he could 
not be reckless. Many Idaho cases recognize the distinction between "negligence" and 
"recklessness." See e.g. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 
902 (2005); Galloway v. Walker 140 Idaho 672, 676, 99 P.3d 625, 629 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Even Black's Law Dictionary recognizes the fact recklessness embraces a higher 
standard than negligence and states in its definition of recklessness that, "Recklessness 
involves a greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser degree of fault than 
intentional wrongdoing." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (West 1999). 
Plaintiffs argument makes even less sense when considered in light of Idaho 
Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013, which govern medical malpractice claims. These 
sections require plaintiffs "[i]n any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or 
death of any person ... on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care 
or on account of any matter incidental or related thereto" to prove through direct expert 
testimony that the defendant "negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or should have 
been provided ... " (Emphasis added). Under these sections, therefore, Plaintiffs had to 
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prove negligence to recover for medical malpractice, and their argument that a finding of 
. recklessness without negligence could have been sufficient must be rejected. 
Plaintiffs sought to instruct the jury on recklessness so they had a basis to pierce 
the statutory non-economic damages cap of Idaho Code§ 6-1603 if the jury found the 
Defendants negligent and returned a damage award above the cap. The issue of the 
statutory non-economic damage cap was only relevant if the jury awards non-economic 
damages in excess of the cap. In fact, the statute specifically provides the jury should 
not be informed of the cap during its deliberations. See I.C. § 6-1603(3) "(If a case is 
tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the limitation contained in subsection (1) 
of this section."). 
Finally, instructing the jury on recklessness and allowing Plaintiffs counsel to 
argue Mr. Byrne was reckless would have greatly prejudiced the Defendants, 
particularly when the issue of recklessness only applied to Mr. Byrne, if it applied in this 
case at all. There was no allegation or expert opinion offered that Dr. Dille or the 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute were reckless. Inserting inflammatory language, such as 
is contained in the reckless jury instruction, would have been particularly prejudicial to 
Dr. Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. The jury could easily have confused the 
parties to whom the recklessness standard applied and improperly applied the 
instructions. 
Therefore, the Court properly exercised its discretion in declining to instruct the 
jury on recklessness until the jury found liability and damages in excess of the statutory 
non-economic damages cap. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants Dr. Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain 
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Institute respectfully submit the Plaintiffs have failed to bear their burden and have not 
established that they are entitled to a new trial under Rule 59 and its subparts. 
Therefore, Defendants request the Court deny the Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial and 
allow the jury's verdict to stand. 
DATED this 3rd day of December 2007. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
N,~U~ 
ILL VARIN 
Atta nays for Defendants 
· ton Dille, M.D. and Southern 
Idaho Pain Institute 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E. 
Comstock and Byron V. Foster, and. respectfufly submit this Reply Memorandum in 
support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Triar. 
!. 
tllifil!MENT 
The Defendants assert that the IDAPA regulations, the Delegation of Services 
Agreement and !he "reckless" jury instruction are all "red herrings" with respect to the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial because the jury found no negligence. However, what 
the Defendants' argument fails to recognize is that a!! of the alleged "red herrings" form 
the standard of care upon which the jury based Its determination of whether the 
Defendants' conduct was negligent Because these "red herrings" were not properly 
addressed at trial, the jury was placed in the position of considering this case under an 
improper standard of care. 
1. THE LATE DISCLOSURE OF THE DELEGATION OF SERVICES 
AGREEMENT PREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFFS 
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs did not suffer prejudice from the 
Defendants' late disclosure of the Delegation of Services Agreement for Mr. Byrne 
because the Defendants supplied the Plaintiffs with the 2004 Delegation of Services 
Agreement and the 2001 job Description early in the discovery process, which 
contained nearly the same language as the 2003 Agreement that the Defendants finally 
disclosed on the eve of trial. However, the Defendants' argument is empty. Plaintiffs 
could not have relied on the 2004 Delegation of Services Agreement or the 2001 Job 
Description to form the theory of their case or produce experts, including rebuttal 
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experts. The 2004 Delegation of Services Agreement and 2004 Job Description have 
no significance to this case because the events that led to Mrs. Schmechel's death and 
the Defendants' relevant conduct occurred in 2003. 
The Defendants further contend that the Plaintiffs are at fault for failing to 
research whether a Delegation of Services Agreement was required in 2003 by the 
IDAPA regulations untl! days before the trial. However, as set forth in the Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Support of a New Trial, the Plaintiffs requested that the Defendants 
produce the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement on June 29, 2006. See, Plaintiffs' 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendant 
Thomas Byrne, attached as Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial ("Foster Aff."), filed on November 19, 2007. The 
Defendants' response was that the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement did not 
exist. See, Defendant Thomas Byrne's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests 
for Production of Documents, attached as Exhibit "C" to Foster Aff. 
More notably, however, it was not the Plaintiffs' burden to research whether the 
Delegation of Services Agreement was required by the IDAPA regulations in 2003 once 
the Plaintiffs requested its production. As Defendants in this case, they had an 
obligation to research whether a Deiegation of Services Agreement existed once the 
Plaintiffs requested one and then provide it to the Plaintiffs. Such is the Defendants' 
burden during discovery. When the Defendants state that a Delegation of Services 
Agreement is not required, they are not complying with their obligation to properly 
respond to discovery and when the Defendants further make representations that 
evidence does not exist, the Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on such representations. 
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Stated another way, the Plaintiffs should not assume that the Defendants will misstate 
the status of a document pertinent to the litigation. The Defendants had an obligation to 
search for the Delegation of Services Agreement in good faith, and they did not do so. 
2. THE DEFENDANTS' COMME:NTS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
EREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFFS 
With respect to State v. Raudebaugh, the Defendants argue that Raudebaugh 
has no bearing on the present case because the court did not address the issue of 
whether a prosecutor's comments during closing arguments constituted a basis for a 
new trial. Plaintiffs' reliance on Raudebaugh is premised on the rule that the Cowi may 
address !he issue of whether the Defendants' comments during closing arguments, 
which mischaracterize the evidence, constitute fundamental error, even though no 
objection was made during the argument. Raudebaugh,124 Idaho 758, 769, 864- P.2d 
596, 607 (1993). Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Raudebaugh Court was addressing 
the issue of prosecutoria! misconduct, but in so doing, the court determined that if the 
prosecutor's statements in his closing arguments distorted the reasonable doubt burden 
of proof, the error would be fundamental because lt would go to the foundation of the 
case. Id. Similarly, in this case, the Defendants commented during closing arguments 
that the Delegation of Services Agreement does not define the standard of care after no 
expert at trial had opined that the Delegation of Services Agreement set forth the 
standard of care. These statements distorted the Plaintiffs' burden of proof regarding 
lhe standard of care and directly impacted !he foundation of the Plaintiffs' case. 
3, THE JURY WAS NOT INSTRUCTED ON THE LAW 
The Defendants argue that the jury was properly instructed with respect to the 
IDAPA regulations in Instruction No, 28. That instruction, however, simply states that 
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"the Court takes judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act." The 
Court's taking judicial notice of the IDAPA regulations, while well-intended, does nothing 
to instruct the jury on the law. Whether the Court takes judicial notice of evidence is 
inconsequential to the jury. Moreover, the purpose in informing the jury that the Court 
had taken judicial notice of the IDAPA regulations is unclear. It is difficult to understand 
the objective in informing the jury of the Court's judicial notice of the law, but ruling that 
the jury cannot consider it. If the Court does not instruct the jury on the law, then the 
jury is preempted from carrying out its fundamental role. 
Although the Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to cross examine Mr. Byrne 
and Dr. Dille with respect to the IDAPA regulations and Mr. Byrne specifically stated that 
the IDAPA regulations are the law that governs physician assistants in Idaho, without 
I.he benefrt of knowing what that law is, the jury was precluded from applying the law to 
the case. As fact finders, that is precisely what the jury's duty ls. The Defendants 
contend that the Court properly precluded the IDAPA regulations from the jury's review 
because they would have been confusing or misleading to the jury, and that they would 
"invite (the jury) to interpret the law for themselves, rather than following the Court's 
instructions on the law." The basic error in this argument is that the IDAPA regulations 
are the law and it is the Court's duty to instruct the jury on ti1e law. 
The Defendants assert that the IDAPA regulations are not clear because they do 
not define certain terms used within the regulations. For instance, the Defendants 
argue, in part, !hat the IDAPA ;egulations do not articulate what it means to "manage" 
the health care of a patient. The Defendants' argument must fall in two respects. First, 
a monumental burden would be placed on the Board of Medicine if it were asked to 
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define every word in a set of regulat1ons it promulgates. Secondly, asking a jury to 
interpret the word "manage" on their own is hardly an unfeasible request. Far less 
rudimentary questions are asked of juries. At the core of this issue, however, is that 
the Board of Medicine was granted with the authority, by the legislature, to adopt 
regulations pertaining to physician assistants to ensure that patients are protected from 
the unauthorized or negligent care of physician assistants, and it is the Court's duty to 
ensure that the legislature's intent is upheld by properly instructing the jury on the law. 
The jury was not so instructed in this case. 
The Defendants also argue that whether the Court admitted the IDAPA 
regulations or not is a moot point because Defendant Dille would have instructed Mr. 
Byrne to prescribe the same dose of Methadone that Mr. Byrne did to Mrs. SchmecheL 
This argument mus! also fail. If the Court would have instructed the jury on the IDAPA 
regulations and the jury concluded that Mr. Byrne was in violation of the regulations, 
then Dr. Dille's after the fact statement that he wouid have treated Mrs. Schmechel the 
same way Mr. Byrne did becomes a self-serving statement designed to shield himself 
from liability. 
In addition, the Defendants' argument with respect to Sanchez v. Galey is 
misguided. The Plaintiffs do not contend that they established the necessary elements 
to substantiate a ciaim of negligence per se. Rather, the Plaintiffs rely on Sanchez v. 
Galey because the Court held that statutes and administrative regulations may define 
the applicable standard of care owed. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617 733 P.2d 
1234, 1242 (1986). In the present case, the IDAPA regulations unquestionably set forth 
the required standard of care for physician assistants in Idaho and the Court in Sanchez 
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recognized that such regulations provide the applicable standard of care to be applied 
to a given case. Regulations that were designed to "govern the activities of persons 
employed as physician assistants" would certainly bestow an appropriate standard of 
care in a case that is centrally focused on the alleged negligence of a physician 
assistant. IDAPA § 22.01.03.000 (2003). 
Lastly, the Defendants' reliance on Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers from the 
Fifth Circuit is misplaced and Alexander is not controfling in this Court. Alexander 
involved a products liability case over a conveyor belt in which the assumption of risk 
was at issue. 731 F.2d i221 (5th Cir. 1984). The plaintiffs in that case argued the court 
erred in not giving the plaintiffs' instructions pertaining to the i 957 American Standard 
Safety Code for Conveyors. 731 F.2d at 1229. The court did not admit the safety code 
because the plaintiff did not urge admission of the Code at trial and because the 
relevant sections had already been read and shown to the jury. Id. In the case at hand, 
the Plaintiffs strongly urged for the admission of the IDAPA regulations and the 
regulations were not read and shown to the jury-rather, they were simply referred to 
during cross examination. 
4. DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED 
The Defendants contend that the Court properly allowed Dr. Smith to testify 
regarding Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death. The Defendants assert that Dr. Smith had 
a basis for changing his opinion regarding the cause of death due to his review of the 
depositions of Dr. Groben and the deputy coroner. The Defendants contend that the 
parties worked diligently to schedule depositions, and the Plaintiffs are not asserting 
that the Defendants purposefully delayed the depositions so that Dr. Smith could 
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change his opinion regarding the cause of death on the eve of trial. However, the fact is 
that the late disclosure prejudiced the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs were precluded from 
obtaining an expert in cardiology that would provide testimony to counter Dr. Smith's. 
Notably, long before Dr. Graben and the deputy coroner were ever deposed, at the time 
of Mrs. Schmechel's death, they prepared written reports that disclosed the same 
information regarding Mrs. Schmechel's death that was disclosed at their depositions. 
After reading those reports, which were generated at the time Mrs. Schmechel died, Dr. 
Smith could have formed the same opinion regarding the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's 
death that he did on the eve of trial. 
Contrary to the Defendants' . arguments, the Plaintiffs do not assert that the 
Defendants purposefully "stone-walled" the Plaintiffs with the late disclosure of Dr. 
Smith's opinions. However, the Plaintiffs were nevertheless "stone-walled" by the late 
disclosure, and the prejudice that ensued runs directly against the policy grains of Rule 
26 (e)(1)(B) articulated in the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 
Idaho 867, 873 136 P,3d 338, 344 (2006). 
5. "RECKLESS" SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN BIFURCATED IN THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
With respect to the bifurcation of the "reckless" instruction, the Plaintiffs urge the 
Court to recognize that when the instructions are taken as a whole, given the evidence 
that was presented at trial, the instructions were confusing or misleading to the jury. 
Regardless of the Plaintiffs' tactical decision to present testimony regarding the alleged 
reckless conduct, the fact is that the Plaintiffs had to present their theory of the case 
without ever knowing how the jury would be instructed. The prejudice that ensued from 
the Court's withholding a ruling on the jury instructions is significant because the 
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Plaintiffs were in the position of trying to postulate which standard the jury would have 
for its deliberations. 
The Defendants also contend that the jury could not have reached the issue of 
whether the Defendants' conduct was reckless without first determining that the conduct 
was negligent. While it is true that "reckless" conduct carries with it a higher degree of 
culpability than negligent conduct, they are, nonetheless, two distinct standards. Either 
the conduct was negligent, or it was reckless; the Defendants' conduct cannot be 
characterized as both. 
Lastly, the Defendants' assertions that instructing the jury on recklessness would 
have prejudiced the Defendants because the issue of recklessness only applied to Mr. 
Byrne must be disregarded. The Court could have easily ciarified the standard as 
applied to each Defendant by providing separate jury instructions. 
!I. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully request a new trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a)(1), (3) and (7) 
because of irregularities, surprises, prejudices, and errors in law that occurred at trial. 
The Idaho Ruf es of Civii Procedure warrant an opportunity for the Plaintiffs to have their 
case tried free of obstructions that preclude their right to a fair trial. WW RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS day of December, 2007. 
ssman, of the firm 
for the Plaintiffs 
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MEMORANUM OPINION AND 
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
David E. Comstock, Taylor V. Mossman, Byron V. Foster, Boise, for the plaintiffs. 
Steven J. Hippler and J. Will Varin, Boise, for defendants Dr. Dille and the 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute. 
Keely E. Duke and Chris D. Comstock, Boise, for defendant Byrne. 
Introduction 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(l),(3) and (7), Plaintiffs Vaughn 
Schmechel, Robert P. Lewis, Kim Howard, and Tamara Hall (the "Schmechels") move 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 1 (\ 0 5 <..I:::.. 
this court for a new trial. For the reasons set forth herein, the Schmechels' motion is 
hereby DENIED. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case involves a medical negligence action against defendants Dr. Clinton 
Dille, M.D. ("Dr. Dille"), the Southern Idaho Pain Institute, and Mr. Thomas Byrne, P.A. 
("Mr. Byrne"). This case was tried to a jury over a ten-day period beginning October 16, 
2007. Both parties presented several expert witnesses and had disclosed other potential 
experts. On October 30, 2007, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding no 
negligence on the part of defendants. The court entered judgment for Mr. Byrne on 
November 5, 2007 and for Dr. Dille on November 9, 2007. 
The Schmechels move for new trial on four separate grounds: (1) the court's 
refusal to allow the Schmechels' experts to offer opinion testimony regarding the 
Delegation of Services Agreement and its relation to the standard of care; (2) the court's 
denying the Schmechels' motion to preclude Dr. Smith from testifying; (3) the court's 
exclusion of the IDAP A regulations from the jury's review during deliberations; and ( 4) 
the court's bifurcation of the issue of recklessness in the jury instructions. The court 
will address each of these in turn. 
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APPLICABLE LAW 
A. 1.R.C.P. 59(a). 
The Schmechels' motion for new trial is brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l),(3) 
and (7), which provides as follows: 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or any 
part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or 
any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
,. 
* * 
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
* * * 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l),(3),(7). 
B. Standard of Review. 
The denial or grant of a motion for new trial is within the district court's 
discretion, and an appellate court will only reverse the district court's decision "based 
on an abuse of discretion." Gillingham Construction, Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Construction, 
Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 121, 129 P.3d 946, 954 (2005). In determining whether a district court 
abused its discretion, an appellate court reviews: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of 
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its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id. (quoting Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. V. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 
1000 (1991)). 
1. Rule 59(a)(l). 
With regard to Rule 59(a)(l), the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[i]n 
evaluating whether an irregularity in the proceedings merits a new trial, a district court 
takes into consideration whether the irregularity had any effect on the jury's decision." 
Id. However, where a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(l) is based on 
misconduct, "the moving party has only the burden to establish that the misconduct 
occurred. The party opposing the motion must then establish that the conduct could 
not have affected the outcome of the trial." Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 
711, 979 P.2d 107, 113 (1999). 
2. Rule 59(a)(3). 
The Court has also held that a party moving for new trial based on "accident or 
surprise" pursuant to Rule 59(a)(3) must show both "prejudice" and "that the alleged 
accident or surprise is one that 'ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."' 
Hughes v. State, Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement, 129 Idaho 558,562,929 P.2d 120, 124 
(1996) (quoting I.R.CP. 59(a)(3)). 
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3. Rule 59(a)(7). 
The Court has further explained a district court's duty under Rule 59(a)(7) as 
follows: 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) states a district court may grant a 
new trial for an 'error in law, occurring at the trial.' The district judge is 
vested with wide discretion to grant or deny a new trial where substantial 
rights of the aggrieved party are not affected and that party is not entitled 
to a new trial as a matter of right. Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 645, 
39 P.3d 577, 585 (2001). Where prejudicial errors of law have occurred, 
however, the district court has a duty to grant a new trial under 
Rule59(a)(7), even though the verdict is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Id. 
Craig Johnson Const., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 800-01, 134 P.3d 
648, 651-52 (2006). Regarding evidentiary rulings specifically, the Court noted that "[i]n 
the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, however, a new trial is merited only 
if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 
892, 104 P.3d 356, 366 (2004) ( citing Highland Enters. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 345, 986 
P.2d 996, 1011 (1999)). 
DISCUSSION 
A. Exclusion Of Expert Testimony Regarding Delegation Of Services 
Agreement. 
The Schmechels move for new trial on several grounds in relation to the court's 
exclusion of the Schmechels' expert testimony regarding the Delegation of Services 
Agreement ("DSA") and how it relates to the standard of care. Specifically, the 
Schmechels contend that under the circumstances, the exclusion of such evidence 
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constitutes an "irregularity in the proceeding" under Rule 59(a)(l), an unfair surprise 
under Rule 59(a)(3), and an error of law under Rule 59(a)(7). 
1. Overview of facts. 
On May 1, 2006 the Schmechels requested that Mr. Byrne produce relevant 
documents, including any DSA in effect in 2003. (See Foster Aff. Exhibit A.) On May 18, 
2006 the Schmechels' counsel took the deposition of Mr. Byrne and questioned him 
regarding a DSA in effect in 2003. Mr. Byrne produced the DSA in effect in 2004. 
Counsel for Dr. Dille then represented that there was no DSA for 2003 because the 
Board of Medicine did not begin requiring them until 2004. (Id.) Byrne also produced a 
2001 Job Description at his deposition. There is no allegation or evidence that Dr. 
Dille's counsel maliciously or in bad faith misrepresented the law regarding delegation 
of services agreements at Byrne's deposition. 
On June 29, 2006 the Schmechels again requested production of "any and all 
delegation of services agreements pertaining to Thomas Byrne, PA." (Foster Aff. Exhibit 
B, at 11.) Byrne responded to this request on July 14, 2006 by stating that "[ d ]ocuments 
responsive to this Request were produced at the deposition of Mr. Byrne on May 18, 
2006." (Foster Aff. Exhibit C, at 4.) 
Approximately fifteen months later, on October 4, 2007, counsel for the 
Schmechels sent a letter to counsel for defendants explaining that ID APA regulations in 
effect in 2003 required a written delegation of services agreement and requesting that 
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defendants supplement their discovery. (See Foster Aff. Exhibit D.) After locating the 
document in storage, Byrne provided the 2003 DSA on October 11, 2007, less than one 
week before trial. (See Foster Aff. Exhibit F.) There is no allegation or evidence that 
Byrne's delay in producing the document was malicious or in bad faith. 
At no time did the Schmechels disclose expert testimony regarding the DSA or 
the 2001 Job Description. The 2003 and 2004 DSA' s are very similar and the relevant 
portion of the 2003 DSA that the Schmechels sought to have an expert testify about is 
identical to the 2004 DSA. 
At trial the Schmechels sought to introduce expert testimony regarding the 2003 
DSA. Defendants objected on the grounds that this was undisclosed expert testimony 
and the court sustained the objection. The court noted that it would consider allowing 
such testimony on rebuttal. However, the Schmechels did not attempt to bring in such 
evidence on rebuttal. 
2. Analysis. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the exclusion of expert testimony regarding 
the DSA does not constitute an irregularity in the proceeding, an unfair surprise, or an 
error of law. The question of whether or not to exclude testimony for failure to timely 
supplement discovery responses is vested in the trial court's discretion. Viehweg v. 
Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271, 647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct. App. 1982). Specifically, a trial 
court may exclude expert opinion testimony where the content of the opinion was not 
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disclosed pursuant to discovery requests. I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4); see also Clark v. Ratay, 137 
Idaho 343, 347, 48 P.3d 672, 676 (Ct. App. 2002). 
It is clear here that the Schmechels never disclosed that their experts would 
testify regarding the existence or contents of a DSA; however, the Schmechels argue 
that the court nonetheless should have permitted such testimony because Byrne did not 
produce the 2003 DSA until less than a week before trial. Although the court recognizes 
that Byrne's delay in disclosing the document placed the Schmechels in a difficult 
situation, the court determines that it properly exercised its discretion to exclude such 
testimony. See Clark, 137 Idaho at 347, 48 P.3d at 676. 
Although counsel for Dr. Dille, in May of 2006, misrepresented that a delegation 
of services agreement was not required in 2003, the Schmechels had full access to the 
ID APA regulations to discover this error. Furthermore, even though the Schmechels 
had access to both the 2001 Job Description and 2004 DSA well in advance of trial, none 
of the Schmechels' experts opined that defendants violated Idaho law regarding the 
DSA and/or job description. Had expert disclosures been made, albeit regarding the 
DSA from the wrong year, or the job description, or even regarding the IDAP A 
regulations, such would have mitigated any surprise or late disclosure problem; 
however, where such a disclosure was not made, the court determined that allowing 
expert testimony at trial regarding the DSA, even though the DSA was disclosed very 
late, would be improper. 
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Considering that Dr. Dille's counsel misrepresented the IDAPA regulations on 
May 18, 2006, the Schmechel' s had ample time to discover the error. However, between 
July 14, 2006, when Byrne responded to the Schmechels' requests for production, and 
October 4, 2007, when the Schmechels sent a letter requesting the 2003 DSA specifically, 
the Schmechels took no action in this regard. As such, the late disclosure of the 2003 
DSA on October 11, 2007 is not the type of "[a]ccident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against" that warrants a new trial. LR.C.P. 59(a)(3) 
(emphasis added). 
Likewise, considering that prior to trial the Schmechels did not disclose potential 
expert testimony regarding any DSA or the apparent failure to have a DSA in 2003, it 
was within the court's discretion to exclude the testimony. Viehweg, 103 Idaho at 271, 
647 P.2d at 317. Had the court permitted such testimony, defendants would have been 
presented with undisclosed expert testimony which they argued at trial they were 
unprepared to rebut. As such, the court properly used its discretion and the exclusion 
was neither an irregularity in the proceeding or an error of law. LR.C.P. 59(a)(1),(7). 
Moreover, the court allowed the Schmechels to inquire extensively of both Mr. 
Byrne and Dr. Dille regarding the DSA and the alleged failure to comply with the 
agreement and abide by Idaho law. While the legal standard in a medical malpractice 
action requires expert testimony to establish breach of the applicable standard of care, 
both Dille and Byrne were experts in their respective fields and the jury had ample 
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evidence in this regard to review and weigh in determining whether a breach of the 
standard of care occurred. 
Thus, even if one were to view the court's exclusion of the Schmechels' expert 
testimony regarding the DSA as an abuse of discretion, it would still not warrant a new 
trial. In this case the jury found, even with the evidence elicited of Byrne and Dille by 
the Schmechels, that Mr. Byrne did not act negligently in his treatment of Mrs. 
Schmechel. 
The court notes the Schmechels' argument that allowing expert opinion 
testimony that Mr. Byrne violated the DSA may have impacted how the jury viewed the 
credibility of defendants' witnesses, and thus may have influenced the jury's findings. 
However, under the circumstances, the court's ruling to exclude such evidence was 
appropriate. Again, the Schmechels had the opportunity to cross examine Mr. Byrne 
during their case-in-chief; they also cross examined Dr. Dille regarding the DSA; lastly, 
they presented argument regarding the DSA to the jury during their closing argument. 
Considering the Schmechels' ability to impeach defendants' witnesses regarding the 
DSA through these means, the excluded expert testimony likely would have had only 
marginal effect, if any, on the credibility of defendants. 
Finally, in excluding expert opinion testimony from the Schmechels' case in 
chief, the court indicated that it would consider allowing such evidence on rebuttal. 
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However, the Schmechels did not seek to offer such testimony at that juncture. As such, 
the Schmechels have in effect waived the issue. 
For the reasons stated above, this court determines that the Schmechels are not 
entitled to a new trial on the basis that the court excluded their expert opinion 
testimony regarding the DSA. 
B. Failure to Exclude Dr. Smith's Testimony. 
Likewise, the Schmechels move for new trial in relation to Dr. Smith's Testimony 
pursuant to Rule 59(a)(l), (3), and (7). For the reasons set forth herein, this argument 
likewise does not merit a new trial. 
1. Overview of Facts. 
On June 17, 2007 defendants disclosed expert testimony of Dr. James Smith as to 
"[a]pplicable medical principles, causation, and damages." (Foster A££. Exhibit F, at 22) 
( emphasis added.) Defendants disclosed the substance of Dr. Smith's opinions in 
pertinent part as follows: 
(Id.) 
It is anticipated Dr. Smith will testify that the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's 
death is uncertain and that another condition she had was just as, if not 
more, likely to have caused her death than Methadone and/or 
Hydrocodone. In providing this opinion, it is anticipated Dr. Smith will 
rely on the descriptions provided regarding the scene of death and his 
knowledge of Mrs. Schmechel's various co-morbid medical conditions and 
personal habits. 
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On June 20, 2007 counsel for Mr. Byrne sent a letter to the Schmechels' counsel 
indicating that Dr. Smith could be deposed after Dr. Groben had been deposed. (See 
Duke Aff. Exhibit 9). On July 31, 2007 Dr. Graben' s deposition was taken. Although 
Dr. Smith was apparently available to be deposed in August 2007, the Schmechels' 
counsel chose not to depose Dr. Smith. (See id. Exhibit 12.) 
Due to scheduling difficulties on the part of both parties and witnesses, the 
deposition of Shaiyenne Anton (also known as Shaiyenne Shindle) was not taken until 
September 5, 2007. Counsel for defendants received the transcript of Ms. Anton's 
deposition on September 24, 2007 and gave it to Dr. Smith for review on September 26, 
2007. After Dr. Smith reviewed both Dr. Groben and Ms. Anton's depositions, Dr. 
Smith apparently altered his opinion, and defendants supplemented Dr. Smith's 
opinions on October 4, 2007 to indicate that "[i]t is anticipated that Dr. Smith will testify 
that on a more probable than not basis, the likely cause of Ms. Schrnechel' s death was a 
cardiac death, likely fatal dysrhythmia. He will testify that the dysrhythmia was caused 
by her underlying cardiac and other co-morbid conditions." (Foster Aff. Exhibit G, at 5.) 
The defendants contend that Ms. Anton's deposition brought to light facts that 
caused Dr. Smith to change his opinion. Specifically, Ms. Anton testified in her 
deposition that it was her opinion that Mrs. Schmechel was awake when she died. (See 
Duke Aff. Exhibit 17, at 44:1 -4.) At trial the Schmechels objected to Dr. Smith's 
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testimony in this regard on the basis that it was expert opinion that had not been timely 
disclosed. 
2. Analysis. 
a. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Smith's 
testimony. 
The Schmechels contend that they were unfairly prejudiced by the late disclosure 
that Dr. Smith would testify that Ms. Schmechel's death was more likely than not 
caused by cardiac failure. Rule 26( e)(l) states that 
[a] party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the response with 
respect to any question directly addressed to . . . the identity of each 
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject 
matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of the 
person's testimony. 
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1). Rule 26(e)(4) then provides that "[i]f a party fails to seasonably 
supplement the responses as required in this Rule 26(e), the trial court may exclude the 
testimony of witnesses or the admission of evidence not disclosed by a required 
supplementation of the responses of the party." I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4). The Court in Edmunds 
v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006), explained the duty that Rule 26(e)(4) 
imposes as follows: 
This Court has held that this rule "unambiguously imposes a continuing 
duty to supplement responses to discovery with respect to the substance 
and subject matter of an expert's testimony where the initial responses have 
been rejected, modified, expanded upon or otherwise altered in some manner." 
Clarie v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 157, 45 P.3d 810, 813 (2002) (quoting Radmer 
v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897 (1991)) (emphasis added). In 
fact, litigants are subject to sanctions, including the exclusion of expert 
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testimony, when they have failed to supplement an expert's opinion. See, 
e.g., Radmer, 120 Idaho at 91, 813 P.2d at 902. 
Id. at 874, 136 P.3d at 345. Under this Rule, the determination of whether to impose the 
sanction of excluding the testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265,271,647 P.2d 311,317 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Here, defendants supplemented their disclosure approximately eleven days prior 
to trial. Thus, the issue is whether defendants "seasonably" supplemented their 
discovery response within the meaning of Rule 26(e)(1). Under the circumstances, 
defendants' supplementation was seasonable. As set forth above, in June of 2007, 
defendants disclosed Dr. Smith as an expert, indicated that he could be deposed after 
Dr. Groben, and made him available for deposition. However, the Schmechels chose 
not to depose Dr. Smith. Due primarily to a scheduling problem that delayed the 
deposition of Ms. Anton, her deposition transcript was not available for review until 
late September. Within days of when Ms. Anton's deposition transcript was prepared 
Dr. Smith reviewed it, and shortly thereafter defendants supplemented their disclosure 
of Dr. Smith's testimony. 
Although the supplemental disclosure was made a mere eleven days prior to 
trial, under the circumstances the disclosure was "seasonably" made and defendants' 
conduct was appropriate under Rule 26(e)(1). The court takes note of the Supreme 
Court's commentary that 
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[w]e do not look favorably upon discretionary decisions by district judges that 
encourage last-minute witness disclosure and unreasonably prevent plaintiffs 
from responding, particularly in complex medical malpractice cases where 
experts will be furnishing the jury with the bulk of the necessary, and often 
technical, facts. 
Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 873, 136 P.3d at 344. However, this court does not view 
defendants' supplemental disclosure of Dr. Smith's opinion the type of "last-minute 
witness disclosure [that] unreasonably prevent[ed] plaintiffs from responding." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
The late disclosure of Dr. Smith's modified opinion was due to scheduling 
difficulties that inevitably arise in a trial of this magnitude, rather than inaction on the 
part of either party. In this regard, Dr. Smith's testimony is distinguishable from the 
Schmechels' excluded expert testimony regarding the DSA, discussed above. The late 
disclosure of the Schmechels' DSA expert testimony was due in part to a delay of more 
than a year by the Schmechels in addressing the issue of whether a DSA was required in 
2003. However, there is no such period of inaction by defendants with regard to Dr. 
Smith's testimony. 
Additionally, unlike the Schmechels' excluded expert testimony regarding the 
DSA, with regard to Dr. Smith's testimony the opposing party was given early notice as 
to its general nature and basis. Specifically, defendants' initial disclosure of Dr. Smith's 
testimony stated that Dr. Smith would testify regarding "causation" and that he "would 
rely on the descriptions provided regarding the scene of the death." (Foster Aff. Exhibit 
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F, at 22.) As Ms. Anton was one of the coroners that provided information regarding 
the death scene, the Schmechels were placed on notice that Ms. Anton's deposition may 
be relevant to Dr. Smith's opinions. Although apparently unavoidable scheduling 
difficulties accounted for Ms. Anton's deposition not being taken until September 2007, 
the Schmechels may have been to able avoid much of the surprise in Dr. Smith's 
opinion by taking his deposition when he was made available in August 2007 and 
acquiring a better general understanding of Dr. Smith's opinions. However, the 
Schmechels chose not to depose him. 
The Schmechels contend that because, based on the initial disclosure of his 
testimony, "Dr. Smith did not seem to have an opinion, on a more likely than not basis, 
the Plaintiffs did not depose him. The Plaintiffs did so under the assumption that the 
Court would not allow an expert to testify unless the expert's opinion met the 'more 
likely than not' standard." (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for New 
Trial, at 7.) Be that as it may, the Schmechels were given notice in June 2007 that 
defendants intended to call Dr. Smith regarding causation. 
For the reasons discussed above, under Rule 26(e)(l) and (4) defendants timely 
supplemented their disclosure of Dr. Smith's testimony and the court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting such testimony to be admitted. As such, the Schmechels are not 
entitled to a new trial under Rule 59(a)(l), (3), and/or (7). 
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b. Any possible error was harmless and does not warrant a new trial. 
However, even if the court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Smith to testify, 
such error would be harmless error because it did not affect the outcome of the case. 
Gillingham Const., 142 Idaho at 23, 121 P.3d at 954 (2005) ("In evaluating whether an 
irregularity in the proceedings merits a new trial, a district court takes into 
consideration whether the irregularity had any effect on the jury's decision."); White v. 
Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 892, 104 P.3d 356, 366 (2004) ("In the case of an incorrect ruling 
regarding evidence, however, a new trial is merited only if the error affects a substantial 
right of one of the parties."); Cf Archer v. Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861, 870, 434 P.2d 
79, 88 (1967) ("[T]he general rule which prevails in this jurisdiction is that a motion for a 
new trial should not be granted unless it appears that a different result would follow a 
retrial."). 
Dr. Smith's testimony related solely to causation. The jury found both 
defendants did not act negligently in their treatment of Mrs. Schmechel. As such, 
testimony regarding the cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death had no bearing on the 
outcome of the case; regardless of the cause of her death, the jury found that defendants 
acted reasonably. Accordingly, if allowing Dr. Smith to testify constituted an unfair 
surprise, irregularity in the proceeding, or error of law, a new trial is nonetheless not 
warranted because it does not "appear[] that a different result would follow a retrial" 
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where Dr. Smith would not be permitted to testify. Archer, 91 Idaho at 870, 434 P.2d at 
88. 
For these reasons, the court finds that the Schmechels are not entitled to a new 
trial because the court allowed Dr. Smith to testify. 
C. Failure to Adequately Instruct the Tucy and/or Admit IDAP A 
Regulations. 
1. Overview. 
The Schmechels requested that the "Rules for the Licensure of Physician 
Assistants," ID APA§ 22.01.03 (2003), be admitted into evidence and that the jury be 
allowed access to them during deliberations. The Schmechels also requested the 
following negligence per se instruction regarding the IDAP A regulations: 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-806(2), the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine is authorized to promulgate rules to govern activities of persons 
employed as physician assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine 
in Idaho. A "supervising physician" is a person registered by the Board 
who is licensed to practice medicine in Idaho, who is responsible for the 
direction and supervision of the activities of the physician assistant. A 
"physician assistant" is a person who has been authorized by the Board of 
Medicine to render patient services under the direction of a supervising 
physician. 
Under applicable Board of Medicine regulations, the defendants in 
this case were required to have in place a delegation of services agreement 
which defined the working relationship between Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne. 
Pursuant to Board of Medicine regulations, a physician assistant may 
issue written or oral prescriptions only in accordance with approval and 
authorization granted by the Board of Medicine and in accordance with 
the delegation of services agreement and shall be consistent with the 
regular prescriptive practice of the supervising physician. 
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Under the Southern Idaho Pain Institute' s Delegation of Services 
Agreement applicable to this case, Mr. Byrne was authorized to conduct 
an initial evaluation of patients seen in the facility, to do a full history and 
physical, and thereafter document his findings and recommendations. It 
was the duty of Dr. Dille, pursuant to the Board of Medicine regulations 
and the Delegation of Services agreement, to review the recommendations 
of Mr. Byrne and to thereafter confirm his findings and to determine a 
treatment plan. 
Failure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine 
regulations and/or the Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of 
the applicable standard of care. 
(Plaintiff's Supplemental Jury Instructions, at 6.) 
The court rejected the Schmechels' request to admit the IDAP A regulations and 
did not give the requested jury instruction. Rather, the court allowed counsel to 
question wih1esses regarding the regulations, read portions of the regulations, and 
show portions of the regulations during wimess examination. The court then instructed 
the jury as follows regarding the ID AP A regulations: 
You are instructed that the court takes judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act, § 22.01.03 (2003, entitled "Rules for the Licensure of Physician 
Assistants." The rules were in effect in 2003. 
(Final Jury Instructions, No. 28.) 
2. Analysis. 
a. The court did not err in failing to give a negligence per se 
instruction. 
Regarding a trial court's determination on jury instructions, the Court explained 
as follows: 
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The correctness of jury instructions 'is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review, and the standard of review of whether a jury 
instruction should or should not have been given, is whether there is 
evidence at trial to support the instruction.' " Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 
744, 750, 86 P.3d 458,464 (2004) (quoting Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 
45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002)). A requested jury instruction must be given if it is 
supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, Bailey, 139 Idaho at 
750, 86 P.3d at 464, but the determination of whether the instruction is so 
supported is committed to the discretion of the district court. State v. 
Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 552, 21 P.3d 483, 489 (2001). Clearly, a requested jury 
instruction need not be given if it is either an erroneous statement of the 
law, adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by the 
facts of the case. State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 89, 831 P.2d 555, 557 (1992). 
Even so, when the instructions taken as a whole do not mislead or 
prejudice a party, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible 
error. Bailey, 139 Idaho at 750, 86 P.3d at 464. 
Craig Johnson Const., 142 Idaho at 800, 134 P.3d at 651. 
Thus, jury instructions are considered proper if, "when considered as a whole 
and not individually, [they] fairly and adequately present the issues and state the 
applicable law." Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 
1009 (1999); see also Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 P.3d 
672, 675 (2002). 
As for a negligence per se instruction, the Court has held that in order for such an 
instruction to be given 
the statute must (1) clearly define the required standard of conduct; (2) the 
statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm 
the defendant's act or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member 
of the class of persons the statute or regulation was designed to protect; 
and (4) the violation must have been the proximate cause of the injury. 
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Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393,395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2001) (citing Sanchez v. Galey, 112 
Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986)). 
Under this standard, the court properly denied the Schmechels' request for a 
negligence per se instruction for two reasons. First, the ID APA regulations do not 
"clearly define the required standard of conduct." Id. Specifically, the IDAPA 
regulation in effect in 2003 permitted a physician assistant to "[d]iagnose and manage 
minor illnesses or conditions" and "manage the health care of the stable chronically ill 
patient in accordance with the medical regimen initiated by the supervising physician." 
ID APA 22.01.03.28.03 and 22.01.03.28.04 (2003). However, the regulations do not define 
terms such as "minor illness" or "manage." Likewise, there is no evidence that these 
terms have definite and universally understood meanings within the .medical 
community. The fact that these regulations do not clearly define the applicable 
standard of care is illustrated by the fact that the Schmechels' own expert testified at 
trial that Mr. Byrne's treatment of Mrs. Schmechel did not violate Idaho law. 
Specifically, Dr. Lordon testified as follows 
Q. [By Ms. Duke] Physician assistants evaluate and treat patients, and 
they do minor medical procedures; correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And that's all appropriate for them to do those things? 
A. Yes it is. 
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Q. It was certainly okay, in your opinion, for Mr. Byrne to prescribe 
medications? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. That's something that Idaho law permits him to do? 
A.Yes. 
Q. And Idaho law also allows physician assistants to evaluate, plan, and 
implement plans of care, and you have no problem with that; correct? 
A. I have no problem with that. 
Q. So you are in no way critical of the fact that Mr. Byrne treated Mrs. 
Schmechel; correct? 
A. No, none whatsoever. 
(Duke Aft. Exhibit 5, at 66:13-67:25.) Because there could be considerable disagreement 
regarding what certain key terms mean, the IDAPA regulation does not "clearly define 
the required standard of conduct." 
Second, in order to warrant a negligence per se instruction, "the violation must 
have been the proximate cause of the injury." Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1079. 
Here Dr. Dille testified that he would not have done anything differently in treating 
Mrs. Schmechel than Mr. Byrne did. (See Duke Aff. Exhibit 18, at 29:17-21 (deposition 
testimony); Duke Aff. Exhibit 19, at 39:11-17 (trial testimony).) Thus, considering that 
Dr. Dille would have offered the same care to Mrs. Schmechel had he been the one 
treating her; the fact that Mr. Byrne treated her could not have been the proximate cause 
of her injury. 
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The Schmechels contend that this view is supported only by Dr. Dille' s "self-
serving" testimony that he would have treated Mrs. Schmechel the same as Mr. Byrne 
did. Nonetheless, considering this testimony in light of the fourth prong of the test laid-
out in Ahles, this court finds that the jury instructions as given, without the requested 
negligence per se instruction, more "fairly and adequately present the issues and state 
the applicable law." Highland Enterprises, 133 ldaho at 343, 986 P.2d at 1009. 
Finally, even assuming that the four prongs discussed above had been met, such 
that a negligence per se instruction would normally be appropriate, it is doubtful that a 
negligence per se instruction should be given in a medical negligence action brought 
pursuant to LC.§§ 6-1012 and 1013. Under LC.§ 6-1012 a medical negligence plaintiff 
"must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct 
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that [the] 
defendant ... negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice . 
. . . " LC. § 6-1012. 
The Schmechels' proposed instruction would have instructed the jury that 
"[f]ailure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine regulations and/or the 
Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of the applicable standard of care." 
(Plaintiff's Supplemental Jury Instructions, at 6.) Accordingly, this proposed instruction 
would have allowed the jury to find that defendants breached the standard of care by 
violating the ID APA regulations, regardless of whether the Schmechels proved as much 
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using direct expert testimony as required by the statute. Given the apparent conflict 
between LC.§ 6-1012 and the Schmechels' proposed negligence per se instruction, the 
court properly refused to give such an instruction. 
b. The court did not err in keeping the IDAP A regulations 
from the jury. 
Likewise, the court properly used its discretion in refusing to admit the ID APA 
regulations into evidence and thus preventing the jury from having them during 
deliberations. Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, a trial court is given considerable 
discretion to exclude evidence because it would potentially confuse the jury. See 
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565,573, 903 P.2d 730, 738 (1995); I.RE. 403. 
The "Rules for the Licensure of Physician Assistants" are intricate and technical. In 
exercising its discretion the court believed that allowing the jury access to such IDAP A 
regulations during deliberations would have created a significant risk of confusing the 
jury with aspects of the regulations that were irrelevant to the case. Additionally, 
counsel were able to read relevant portions of the regulations and question witnesses on 
them during examination; counsel were also free to reference the regulations and show 
them to the jury via the in-court video device, during closing argument. 
Thus, no substantial right of the Schmechels was affected by the failure to admit 
the IDAPA regulations as an exhibit. See Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc., 731 
F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[N]o substantial right of Alexander's was affected by 
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the failure to admit the Code as an exhibit because the relevant sections had already 
been read and shown to the jury.") 
D. Bifurcation of Recklessness Issue. 
The Schmechels also move for new trial on the basis that the court's bifurcation 
of the recklessness issue constitutes an irregularity in the proceeding under Rule 
59(a)(l) and/or an error of law under Rule 59(a)(7). This court determines a new trial is 
not warranted on this basis because the recklessness issue was properly bifurcated from 
the initial jury instructions. 
1. Overview. 
The Schmechels requested that the court instruct the jury on recklessness. 
However, the court did not give such a jury instruction in the Final Jury Instructions 
given prior to deliberations; rather, the court indicated that it was inclined to give such 
an instruction if the jury returned a verdict with a damages award in excess of the 
statutory non-economic damages cap. Because the jury returned a verdict finding no 
negligence, no recklessness instruction was ever given. 
2. Analysis. 
The Schmechels contend, on two bases, that they are entitled to a new trial 
because the court did not give a reckless instruction with the Final Jury Instructions. 
First, the Sc:hmechels contend that, because Dr. Lipman testified at trial that defendants' 
conduct was reckless, the lack of such an instruction "likely confused or misled the 
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jury." (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, at 12.) Second, the 
Schmechels contend that "[i]n preventing the Plaintiffs from arguing recklessness in the 
closing argument and in precluding the jury from even considering whether the 
defendants' conduct was reckless, the Court in effect, severed the Plaintiffs' case and 
prevented the jury from making their own determination on whether the defendants' 
conduct was reckless." (Id. at 12-13.) 
The court determines that both of these arguments are without merit. As noted 
above, jury instructions are proper if, "when considered as a whole and not 
individually, [they] fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable 
law." Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999) 
(emphasis added). Reversible error occurs when an instruction misleads the jury or 
prejudices a party. Howell v. Eastern R.R., Inc., 135 Idaho 733, 740, 24 P.3d 50, 57 (2001). 
In order to prove recklessness in a medical negligence action, the Schmechels 
were necessarily required to prove negligence. See Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (West 
1999) ("Recklessness involves a greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser 
degree of fault than intentional wrongdoing."); see also§ I.C. 6-1012 (requiring a medical 
malpractice plaintiff to prove that the defendant "negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of care") ( emphasis added). 
Thus, the jury could not have found recklessness without first finding 
negligence. And until the jury returned a verdict finding negligence and damages in 
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excess of the non-economic damages cap, recklessness was not a relevant issue in this 
case. Considering the complexity of this case and the number of jury instructions 
already required, the court properly bifurcated the recklessness issue so the jury could 
focus only on the immediately relevant issues. 
However, even if the court erred by not giving a recklessness instruction in the 
Final Jury Instructions, this was harmless error. In Gillingham Construction the court 
held that "[i]n evaluating whether an irregularity in the proceedings merits a new trial, 
a district court takes into consideration whether the irregularity had any effect on the 
jury's decision." 142 Idaho at 23, 121 P.3d at 954 (2005). In the case at hand the absence 
of a reckless instruction had no effect on the outcome of the case and did not affect the 
substantial rights of the Schmechels. 
Moreover, this court does not agree that the jury was confused or misled by the 
presentation of evidence regarding recklessness in the absence of an instruction on the 
subject. The evidence regarding recklessness was limited to brief testimony by Dr. 
Lipman; it is not as though this whole case centered on recklessness and then the court 
did an "about face" at the end of trial, taking the recklessness issue from the jury. See 
Lipman Transcript, p. 73:1- 77:20. Accordingly, this court finds that the court's 
bifurcation of the recklessness issue is not grounds for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(l), 
(3), and/or (7). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Schmechels' Motion for New Trial is 
DENIED. ~-
Dated this~ day of January, 2008. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
G. RICHARD BEV AN 
District Judge 
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INTRODUCTION 
This matter is before the court on the motion/memoranda of the defendants 
seeking an award of costs in the above-entitled matter pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) and 
681. The defendants are awarded costs as set forth herein. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The procedural history in this case is set forth in this court's opinion on the 
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, filed on January 23, 2008. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A) provides that a prevailing party shall 
be awarded costs, unless otherwise provided by the court or limited by the rules. Rule 
54(d)(1)(C) provides that a party is entitled to certain costs actually paid as a matter of 
right. 
A. Undisputed Costs. 
There is no dispute about the following costs, which are awarded to each party 
as a matter of right: 
Dr. Dille: 
• Court Filing Fees $52.00 
• Defendant Expert Dr. Hare 2,000.00 
The defendants both reference Rule 68 in their motions, but the record is silent regarding an offer of 
judgment from either defendant in the case. The plaintiffs have stipulated in their response to each defendant's 
motion that the defendants are the prevailing party in this case. 
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• Defendant Expert Dr. Binegar 
• Reporting and Transcriptions 
Total 
Mr. Byrne: 
• Court Filing Fees 
• Fees for Service 
• Defendant Expert Chris Kottenstette 
• Defendant Expert Dr. Smith 
• Reporting and Transcriptions 
Total 
B. Disputed Costs as a Matter of Right. 
2,000.00 
6,137.07 
$10,189.07 
$52.00 
320.00 
2,000.00 
2,000.00 
9,594.77 
$13,966.77 
The plaintiffs have objected to costs claimed as a matter of right for exhibit 
preparation, in the amount of $500.00 for each defendant. The court concludes that 
such amounts have been certified as paid by each defendant; however, Dr. Dille and 
Mr. Byrne indicate only that such amounts were paid for exhibits prepared for the trial; 
no certification is made that such exhibits were admitted as required by the Rule. See 
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 371, 766 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Ct. App. 
1988) (holding that the trial court erred by ordering non-discretionary costs for an 
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exhibit prepared for trial but not admitted into evidence). The court finds that the 
defendants offered several exhibits into evidence, and prepared juror notebooks and 
exhibits for the court. As such, the court will award Dr. Dille $300.00 for these costs 
pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(6). Mr. Byrne will be awarded $500.00 for these costs 
since he incurred more, in total, for these expenses, than did Dr. Dille. 
Mr. Byrne also claims $2,000 for payment of Dr. Kimberly Vorse' s deposition fee. 
While Dr. Vorse is a physician who specializes in pain management, she testified at trial 
as a fact witness, having treated Mrs. Schmechel for several years. Dr. Vorse did not 
testify as an expert witness during the trial. As such, the court will not award her 
deposition cost as a matter of right. 
C. Discretionary Costs. 
1. Legal Standard. 
A trial court may award a prevailing party "necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred" which "should in the interest of justice be assessed against the 
adverse party." LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). An award of discretionary costs is subject to the 
trial court's discretion. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 59, 
995 P.2d 816, 829 (2000). When ruling upon objections to discretionary costs, the trial 
court is required to "make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary 
cost should or should not be allowed." Id. However, express findings must only be 
made "'as to the general character of requested costs and whether such costs are 
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necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply 
with this requirement.' Thus, the district court need not evaluate the requested costs 
item by item. Id. Hayden Lake Fire Protec. Dist., 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168 (citing 
Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384, 973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999); Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 
492,494,960 P.2d 175, 177 (1998))." 
2. Dr. Dille's Discretionary Costs. 
Dr. Dille seeks discretionary costs in the amount of $24,889.65 for expert witness 
fees exceeding amounts allowed as a matter of right. He also seeks copying costs of 
$87.72, $587.00 for copies of or access to learned treatises, and $8,482.39 for travel 
expenses. The court will analyze these costs in reverse order. 
a. Travel expenses. 
A court may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the 
nature of the case. Id.; see also City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,588, 130 P.3d 1118, 
1126 (2006); Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 
(2005). In this case all counsel assumed responsibility for this case knowing that it was 
a Twin Falls case, involving Twin Falls witnesses. Parties are certainly free to hire 
counsel of their choosing, but in so doing, the parties must bear the brunt of the 
required travel from Boise to Twin Falls. Moreover, this court concludes that travel 
expenses are the norm in a modern medical malpractice case. As such, the costs 
associated with travel to take depositions are part of "modern litigation overhead," 
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which are not exceptional in any way. Travel expenses must therefore be borne by the 
parties themselves. Accord Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377,381, 973 P.2d 148, 152 (1999). 
The court will, however, award Dr. Dille the travel expense associated with the 
second trip to Salt Lake City to complete the deposition of Dr. Lordon, in the amount of 
$446.52. The court does find that these expenses were exceptional, and were 
necessitated by Dr. Lordon calling the deposition short due to personal circumstances. 
While Dr. Lordon's scheduling difficulties are not the fault of the Schmechel family, 
neither are they the fault of Dr. Dille. The equities in the case regarding this specific 
cost request should be borne by the plaintiffs. 
b. Learned Treatises. 
The court declines to award any discretionary cost for learned treatises because 
such costs are not necessary and exceptional costs which should, in the interest of 
justice, be borne by the Schmechel family in this case. 
c. Copying Costs. 
The court will not award Dr. Dille copying costs beyond the $300.00 discussed 
above. As set forth, such expenses were awarded in a total amount that the court 
determined was just and proper given the circumstances of the case. 
d. Expert Witness Fees Exceeding Amounts Allowed. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that 
[i ]n reviewing a grant or denial of discretionary costs, the key issue is 
whether the record indicates express findings by the district court as to 
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whether a cost was necessary, reasonable, exceptional and should be 
awarded in the interests of justice. The district court does not have to 
engage in a lengthy discussion of these factors. 
Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). 
Accordingly, in using its discretion under Rule 54(d)(1)(D), this court considers whether 
Dr. Dille' s expert witness fees were necessary, reasonable, and exceptional and whether 
they should be awarded in the interests of justice. 
As to whether costs are exceptional, the Court has stated that "[a] [trial] court 
may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the nature of the case." 
City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,588, 130 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2006) (emphasis 
added). In Seubert, a condemnation case, the party seeking costs argued that the trial 
court erred in finding that the costs were not exceptional because "multimillion dollar 
condemnation cases are exceptional in themselves, requiring extensive expert testimony 
and use of exhibits and models." Id. The Court upheld the denial of costs where the trial 
court found such costs were "'routine costs associated with modern litigation overhead' 
in a condemnation case." Id. at 588-89, 130 P.3d at 1126-27 (quoting trial court). 
Likewise, in Hayden Lake the Court upheld a trial court's denial of expert witness 
fees where "the trial court considered the nature of [the] case as a class action and its 
effect on numerous Idaho businesses and found that although expert witnesses were 
necessary and their fees reasonable, the costs were not exceptional for a class action 
suit." 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. 
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Similarly, in Fish v. Smith, 960 P.2d 175, 131 Idaho 492 (1998), the Court upheld a 
trial court's finding that expert witness fees and related costs were not exceptional in a 
personal injury case. The Fish Court quotes the trial court at length: 
The trial court pointed out that "expert witnesses-medical; 
neuropsychological; accident reconstruction; vocational; and so forth-
routinely testify in serious personal injury actions," and that "[t]he vast 
majority of litigated personal injury cases . . . routinely require an 
assessment of the accident and the alleged injuries by various sorts of 
doctors of medicine, accident reconstructionists, vocational experts and so 
on." The trial court concluded: "This is the very 'nature' of these sorts of 
cases. Similarly, travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses and 
attorneys and photocopy expenses are not exceptional but, on the 
contrary, are common 'in a case of this nature."' 
Id. at 494, 960 P.2d at 177. Accordingly, based on this precedent, it is clear that this 
court "may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the nature of 
the case." Seubert, 142 Idaho at 588, 130 P.3d at 1126. 
Additionally, the Court has held that discretionary costs may be considered 
exceptional if the case itself is exceptional. Specifically, in Hayden Lake the Court 
explained as follows: 
This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost be 
"exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those costs incurred 
because the nature of the case was itself exceptional. In Great Plains Equip., 
the Court specifically noted that discretionary costs, including those for 
expert witness fees, were "exceptional given the magnitude and nature of 
the case." [Great Plains Equip. Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 
466, 475, 36 P.3d 218, 227 (2001)]. Furthermore, Fish held that a district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying discretionary costs associated 
with expert witness fees where the trial court had properly determined 
the case itself was not "exceptional." Fish, 131 Idaho at 493, 960 P.2d at 
177. Certain cases, such as personal injury cases generally involve copy, 
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travel and expert witness fees such that these costs are considered 
ordinary rather than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). See e.g. 
[Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384, 973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999)]. 
Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. Accordingly, in determining whether the 
case is exceptional, a court may consider the "magnitude and nature of the case." Id. 
(citing Great Plains Equip., 136 Idaho at 475, 36 P.3d at 227). 2 
Therefore, analyzing whether the factors set forth in Rule 54( d)(l )(D) are present, 
this court first concludes that the expert witness fees incurred by Dr. Dille were 
necessary and reasonable. The experts that Dr. Dille retained were necessary to 
establish his defense to the claims asserted by the plaintiffs throughout this litigation. 
Furthermore, while the witness fees charged by experts in this case were large, they 
were reasonably incurred, as the fees charged for both sides' experts were in. the same 
approximate range. 
However, considering the nature and magnitude of the case, this court finds that 
such expenses were not exceptional. Although medical negligence cases are more 
complicated and involve more experts than some other types of cases, the court does 
not consider the case exceptional solely because it involved medical negligence. As 
discussed above, the Court has held that trial courts did not abuse their discretion in 
2 In their briefing, both Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne also cite the court to Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403 
(1996). Both defendants cite to this case, without pinpoint reference, for the holding that "that costs may be 
exceptional based on the nature of the case itself, i.e., if the case itself is exceptional." (Dille's Amended Verified 
Memo of Costs, at 6; Byrne's Amended Verified Memo of Costs, at 6.) However, this court could find no holding 
remotely similar to this in the three short paragraphs in Harris that discuss Rule 54(d)(l)(D). See Harris, 128 Idaho 
at 574,917 P.2d at 408. Rather, in Harris the Court did not mention how the nature of the case related to Rule 
54(d)(l)(D) and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discretionary costs. Id 
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finding that costs were not exceptional in a multimillion dollar condemnation 
proceeding, a class action involving numerous Idaho businesses, and a serious personal 
injury case involving medical and other experts. Seubert, 142 Idaho at 588-98; Hayden 
Lake, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168; Fish, 131 Idaho at 493-94, 960 P.2d at 175-76. As 
such, it is well within this court's discretion to find that this medical negligence case is 
not such an exceptionally complex case as to warrant a finding that expert fees involved 
were exceptional. 
Furthermore, there is nothing else about the "magnitude and nature" of this 
particular medical negligence case to support a finding that the expert witness costs 
involved here were beyond the norm in such cases. See Great Plains Equipment, 136 
Idaho at 226-27; 36 P.3d at 474--75. Specifically, LC.§ 6-1012 requires a medical 
negligence plaintiff to, "as an essential part of his or her case in chief," present "direct 
expert testimony." LC.§ 6-1012. Thus, it is likewise necessary for a medical negligence 
defendant to present expert testimony in order to mount a suitable defense and the 
expert witness fees required for this case are not beyond what is to be generally 
expected in a medical negligence case. 
The court notes the defendants' argument that the complexity of this case was 
increased because of the Schmechels' numerous and changing claims relating to 
defendants' conduct and Mrs. Schmechels' death. Nonetheless, the court finds that the 
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issues involved in this case were not so complex that the cost for the necessary experts 
was exceptional under Rule 59(d)(1)(D). 
The court notes the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in Puckett v. Verska, 
144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007), where the Court upheld a trial court's award of 
$120,714.85 in discretionary costs in a medical malpractice action. Id.; (see Byrne's Aff. 
of Counsel Exhibit A, Puckett, Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's Request for Costs.) 
In Puckett the Court upheld the award, noting that the trial court properly "considered 
the exceptionality of the costs in light of the 'long course of litigation and complexity of 
this case."' Puckett, 144 Idaho 169, 158 P.3d at 945. This court does not dispute that the 
trial court in Puckett properly exercised its discretion in determining that the costs 
involved in that case were exceptional under Rule 54(d)(l)(D). However, this court 
finds that unlike Puckett, the case at hand was not such a long and complex medical 
malpractice case that the costs involved were exceptional. Rather, Dr. Dille's expert 
witness costs are better described as "routine costs associated with modern litigation 
overhead." Seubert, 142 Idaho at 589, 130 P.3d at 1127. 
Because the court finds that Dr. Dille' s expert wih,ess fees were not 
"exceptional," under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) such an award will not be made in this case. 
Therefore, the court need not consider whether it would be in the interests of justice to 
award such costs. 
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3. Mr. Byrne's Discretionary Costs. 
Thomas J. Byrne seeks discretionary costs in the amount of $27,796.16 for expert 
witness fees exceeding amounts allowed as a matter of right. He also seeks costs for 
trial exhibits of $928.85, $774.60 for copying expenses, $87.65 for learned treatises and 
$7,699.36 for travel expenses. The court will analyze these costs in reverse order. 
a. Travel expenses. 
As set forth above for Dr. Dille, the court concludes that the costs for travel are 
assumed by the parties hiring out-of-town counsel for a Twin Falls case. Also as set 
forth above, travel expenses are the norm in a modern medical malpractice case. As 
such, the costs associated with travel to take depositions are part of "modern litigation 
overhead," which are not exceptional. Travel expenses must therefore be borne by the 
parties themselves. Accord Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 381, 973 P.2d 148, 152 (1999). 
The court will, however, award Mr. Byrne some of the travel expense associated 
with the second trip to Salt Lake City to complete the deposition of Dr. Lordon, in the 
total amount of $776.79. The court reaches this conclusion on the same rationale as set 
forth above for Dr. Dille; however, the court concludes that the claimed $597.51 for 
miscellaneous lodging, meals and taxi fares to be excessive, in light of the fees requested 
for two other such trips to Salt Lake City, which average less than $150.00 for each. As 
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such, the court's award limits the amount for the miscellaneous expenses incurred to 
complete Dr. Lordon's deposition to $200.00. 
b. Copy and Exhibit Costs. 
The court awarded Mr. Byrne the $500.00 maximum for exhibit preparation as a 
matter of right in this case. The court declines to award any additional costs for 
copying or exhibits, on the basis that the court concludes $500.00 is fair for these 
expenses. The court also concludes that such additional expense is part of modern 
litigation overhead. Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 381, 973 P.2d 148, 152 (1999). 
c. Learned Treatises. 
The court declines to award any discretionary cost for learned treatises because 
such costs are not necessary and exceptional costs which should, in the interest of 
justice, be borne by the Schmechel family in this case. 
e. Expert Witness Fees Exceeding Amounts Allowed. 
The court reaches the same conclusion regarding these costs as it did for Dr. 
Dille, supra. Again, the court concludes that Mr. Byrne's retained or called experts were 
necessary and that the amounts these experts charged were reasonable. However, this 
court concludes that such costs are not exceptional within the meaning of Rule 
54(d)(l)(D) for the same reasons as have already been stated, supra, pp. 6-11. 
Accordingly, such costs are denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Counsel for the defendants are ordered to 
prepare amended judgments in conformity with the following within seven (7) days of 
the date hereof: 
Dr. Dille: 
• Costs as a Matter of Right 
• Disputed Costs as a Matter of Right 
• Discretionary Costs 
Total 
Mr. Byrne: 
• Costs as a Matter of Right 
• Disputed Costs as a Matter of Right 
• Discretionary Costs 
Total 
IT rs so ORDERED. 
Dated this d/~ay of January, 2008. 
~I 
G. RICHARD BEV AN 
District Judge 
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300.00 
446.52 
$10.935.59 
$13,966.77 
500.00 
776.79 
$15,243.56 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KlM HOWARD and TAMARA 
HALL natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
The above captioned case was tried to a jury from October 16 through October 30, 2007, and 
consistent with the jury verdict rendered herein by the jury on the 30th day of October, 2007; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that, consistent with the Special Verdict, 
judgment is entered in favor of defendant Thomas J. Byrne, against plaintiffs, and that all claims 
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asserted by plaintiffs against Thomas J. Byrne are hereby dismissed with prejudice, and with 
plaintiffs taking nothing thereby. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, and this does order, that, consistent with the 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Costs dated January 24, 2008, 
Thomas J. Byrne is awarded costs in the amount of$15,243.56. 
DATED this d_ day of February, 2008. 
/ 
G. Richard Bevan, District Judge 
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Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
Byron V. Foster, ISB # 2760 
Attorney At Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, ID 83701-1584 
Telephone: (208) 336-4440 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, ) 
and as Surviving Spouse and ) 
Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, ) 
deceased, and ROBERT P. LEWIS, ) 
KIM HOWARD and TAMARA HALL, ) 
natural children of ROSALIE ) 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
VS. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., 
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I 
through X, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL • 1 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, Thomas Byrne, P.A., AND HIS 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, Hall Farley, Oberrecht and Blanton, P.A., 702 West Idaho, 
Suite 700, P.O. Box 1271 Boise, ID, 83701, and Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho 
Pain Institute, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, Givens Pursley, LLP, 601 W. 
Bannock Street P.O. Box 2720, Boise, Idaho 83701-2720, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, Vaughn Schmechel, Robert Lewis, Kim 
Howard and Tamara Hall, appeal against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the District Court's Order denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for New 
Trial entered in the above-entitled action on the 23rd day of January, 2008, the 
Honorable Richard Bevan presiding. 
2. That the Plaintiffs/ Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court, and the District Court's Decision referred to in paragraph 1 above is appealable 
under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1) and (5), I.A.R. 
3. The Appellants request a review of the District Court's denial of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion for New Trial. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. The Appellants request the preparation of the Standard Transcript 
pursuant to I.A.R. 25(c) of the jury trial which occurred on October 16, 2007, through 
October 30, 2007. Additionally, the Plaintiffs/Appellants request the preparation of the 
following: 
a. The reporter's transcript for all parties' opening and closing 
arguments; 
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b The reporter's transcript for the conferences on requested jury 
instructions, the objections of the parties to the instructions, and the 
court's ruling thereon; 
c. The reporter's transcript for any conferences on questions received 
from the jury during deliberations; and 
d. The reporter's transcript for the hearing on Plaintiffs/Appellants' 
Motion for New Trial which occurred on December 17, 2007. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
a. Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions dated October 9, 2007; 
b. Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions dated 
October 18, 2007; 
c. Plaintiffs' Bench Brief Re: Proposed "Reckless" Instruction dated 
October 18, 2007; 
d. Plaintiffs' Objections to the Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
dated October 19, 2007; 
e. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Bench Brief Re "Reckless" Jury Instruction 
dated October 23, 2007; 
f. Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions dated 
October 26, 2007; 
g. Defendants' Joint Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury 
Instructions dated October 26, 2007; 
h. Final Jury Instructions dated October 30, 2007; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 551 
i. Defendants' Joint Objections to Court's Proposed Final Jury 
Instructions dated October 30, 2007; 
j. Special Verdict Form dated October 30, 2007; 
k. Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial dated November 19, 2007; 
I. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial dated 
November 19, 2007; 
m. Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New 
Trail and exhibits thereto dated November 19, 2007; 
n. Defendants Clinton Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institutes' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial dated December 3, 
2007; 
o. Affidavit of Steven J. Hippler in Support of Defendants Clinton Dille 
and Southern Idaho Pain Institutes' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion 
for New Trial dated December 3, 2007; 
p. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne'e Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial dated December 3, 2007; 
q. Affidavit of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant Thomas J. 
Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for New 
Trial dated December 3, 2007; 
r. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New trial 
dated December 13, 2007; 
s. Amended Affidavit of Counsel, Keely E. Duke, with attachments, 
dated December 17, 2007; 
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t. Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial dated 
January 23, 2008. 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the 
reporter. 
b. That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee 
for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
c. That the estimated Jee for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid. 
d. 
e. 
DATED This 
That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
re 
::?. day of March, 2008. 
Taylor rvi'ossman, of the Firm 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ·:s r-tP day of March, 2008, l served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
601 W. Bannock St. 
PO Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, PA 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
PO Box 1271 
Boise ID 83701 
~ U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile (208) 388-1300 
D E-Mail 
Wu.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile (208) 395-8585 
D E-Mail 
----~ .... ~-~.,, /r-:M [Af VL__ 
T~ylo1 Mossman 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
Keely E. Duke 
!SB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
Chris D. Comstock 
!SB #6581; cdc@hallfarley,com 
DISTRICT COURT 
TWIN FALLS CO. !D,o "D F'ILED .n 
2008 MAR 17 PM 4: 27 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERREClfT & BLANTON, P,A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
13y _______ , 
\\,t_,, CLERr( 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
----\)~--DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\2\2404.53\F.equcsl for t\dditioncl' Oocwnems on Appeal.doe 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byme 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTR1CT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCI·IMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KIM HOW ARD and TAMARA 
HALL natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-0S-4345 
.DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, 
P,A.'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A.'S REQUEST FORADDmONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - l 
555 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS AND THE PARTIES' 
ATTORNEYS OF RECOlUJ, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT. 
>e,ivvv 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the respondent, Thomas J. Byrne, ln the above entitled 
proceeding hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the 
following material in the Reporter's Transcnpt and Clerk's Record in addition to that required to be 
included by the Idaho Appellate Rules and the Notice of Appeal: 
1. Requested additions to the Reporter's Transcript: 
a. The reporter's transcript for the hearing on the parties' motions ln limine 
which occurred on October 11, 2007 and all other hearings and/or the 
court's rulings on the parties' motions in lhnine; and 
b. The reporter's transcript fur al! hearings and/or the conferences held on 
the record during trial and outside the jury's presence. 
2. Requested additions to the Clerk's Record: 
a. Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, dated March 2, 2006; 
b. Notice of Jury Trial Setting, Pretrial Conference and Order Governing 
Further Proceedings, dated March 9, 2006; 
c. Plaintiffs' Expert Witness :Disclosure, dated April 19, 2007; 
d. Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, dated June 15, 
2007; 
e. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Disclosure ofExpett Witnesses, dated June 
18, 2007; 
f Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, dated 
September 6, 2007; 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A.'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - 2 
55G 
g. Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, dated 
Sep tern ber 11, 2007; 
h. Defendant Thomas Byrne, P .A.'s Exhibit List, filed September 24, 2007; 
i. Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute Trial 
Exhibit List, filed September 24, 2007; 
j. Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. wd Southern Idaho Pain Institute' s Trial 
Witness List, filed September 24, 2007; 
k. Pretrial Conference Order Pursuant to I.R. C.P. 16( d), dated September 
25, 2007; 
l. Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.' s Witness List, dated September 26, 
2007; 
m. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed September 26, 2007; 
n. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed 
September 26, 2007; 
o. Defendant Thomas J. Byrnes' Motion in Limine Re: Various Issues, filed 
October 1, 2007; 
p. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Thomas Byrne, P.A.' s Motion in 
Limine Re Various Issues, filed September 27, 2007; 
q. Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southem Idaho Pain Institute's 
Motions in Limine, filed September 28, 2007; 
r. Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's 
Memo1andum in Support ofMotions in Limine, filed October 1, 2007; 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A. 'S REQUEST FOR ADDlTIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD· 3 
r: 5..., 
'\) • I 
s. Memorandum in Support of Thomas J. Byrne's Motion in Limine Re: 
Various Issues, filed October 1, 2007; 
t. Affidavit of J. Will Varin irt Support of Clinton Dille and Southern Idaho 
Pain Institute' s Motions in Limine, filed October 1, 2007; 
u. Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed October 4, 2007; 
v. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed 
October 4, 2007; 
w. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.'s Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, filed October 4, 2007; 
x. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 's Joinder in Clinton Dille and Southern 
Idaho Pain Instliute's Motion in Limine, filed October 4, 2007; 
y. Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, filed 
October 5, 2007; 
z. Affidavit of J. Will Varin in Support of Clinton Dille and Southern Idaho 
Pain Institute' s Response to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed October 5, 
2007; 
aa. Defondant Thomas J. Byrne's Supplemental Disclosure of Expert 
Witnesses, filed October 5, 2007; 
bb. Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, filed October 
5, 2007; 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A. 'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCR!PT AND RECORD • 4 
5 c; r, 'l.- V ;-J 
cc. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed 
October 9, 2007; 
dd. Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute' s Reply 
to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, filed October 
9, 2007; 
ee. Defo11dants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute' s 
Joinder in Defendant Byrne's Motion in Limine, filed October 9, 2007; 
ff. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P .A.'s Proposed Special Verdict Form, filed 
October 9, 2007; 
gg. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Trial Brief, filed October 9, 2007; 
hh. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's, P.A.' s Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 
October 9, 2007; 
ii. Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A. 's Joinder in Clinton Dille, M.D. and 
Southern fdaho Pain Institute's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendants Motions in Limine, filed October 10, 2007; 
jj. Defendants' Joint Exhibit List, filed on October 10, 2007; 
kk. Defendant Clinton lJille, M.D. and Southem Idaho Pain Institute' s Trial 
Brief, filed October 10, 2007; 
11. Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Jury 
Instructions, dated October 10, 2007; 
mm. Affidavit of Chris D. Comstock Regarding the Parties' Motions in 
Limine, filed October 15, 2007; 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A,'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD· 5 
r.:, r; 9 
t. V, 
nn. Defendants Clinton DJIJe, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute'sFirst 
Supplemental Jury lnstructkms, filed October 15, 2007; 
oo. Order Re: Motions in Limine, filed October I 6, 2007; 
pp. Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. 
Lipman, filed October 30, 2007; and 
qq. Declaration of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Objection to Proposed 
Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Lipman, filed October 30, 2007. 
3. r certify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been served on 
each court reporter of whom a 1ranscript is requested s named below at the addresses set out below: 
Name and address: Virginia Bailey, P.O. Box 126, Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
I further certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk oftbe 
district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED t;his ./J.!!aay of March, 2008. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
By{LQ~ 
k Keely E. Duke - Of the Finn {J · · Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, PA'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD· 6 
5SQ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .Jl!!:. day of March, 2008, I caused to be served a true copy of 
the foregoing DEFENDANT TB:OMAS J. BYRNE, P.A.'8 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPT AND RECO'.RD, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
David Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199:N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
601 W. Bannock ST. 
POBox2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300 
/4s. Mail, l'ostage Prepaid 
I-land Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
/4. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hattd Delivered 
_ Ovemigb.t Mail 
__ Telecopy 
Keely E. Duke 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A.'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD· 7 
Page, or~ · 
Steven J. Hippler ISB #4388 
J, WIii Varin ISB #6981 
Givens Pursley LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
S:ICLIENTS\740512\Roqu .. t for AddlUonal Roeorde.ooe 
Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dille, M.D. 
and Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF lWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and : 
as Surviving Spouse and Personal i 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE : 
SCHME.CHEL, deceased, and ROBE.RT : 
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA: 
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE : 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, : 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' CLINTON DILLE, M.D., · SOUTHERN : 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho : 
' corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and : 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, : 
' ' 
Defendants, 
' 
' 
Case No. CV 05 4345 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLS, 
M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN 
INSTITUTE'S REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND 
RECORDS 
TO: ·· THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS AND THE PARTIES' 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD AND THE REPORTER AND CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Defendants/Respondents, Clinton Dille, 
M.D. and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute, in the above entitled proceeding hereby 
request, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate R.uies, the inclusion of the following 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILL~, M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTe'S REQUEST l'OR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS ANO RECORDS.• 1 
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material in the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record in addition to that required to 
be included by the Idaho Appellate Rules and the Notice of Appeal: 
1. Reque11ted Additions to Report's Transcript: 
a. The report's transcript for all hearings and/or the oourt's rulings on the 
parties' Motions in Limine, including those hearings conduct on 
October 11, 2007 and those conducted between October 15-31, 2007; 
and 
b. The report's transcript for all hearings and/or the conferences held on 
the record during trial and outside the Jury's presence. 
2. Requested Additions to Clerk's Record: 
File Date on 
ROA 
a. 12/14/2005 
b. 02/15/2006 
C. 03/02/2006 
d. 03/09/2006 
Document 
Order for Scheduling Conference and Order RE: 
Motion Practice 
Order for Scheduling Conference and Order RE: 
Motion Practice 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning 
Notice Of Ju,y Trial Setting, Pretrial Conference 
And Order Governing Further Proceedings 
e. · 04/20/2007 Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures 
f, 06/18/2007 
g. 06/25/2007 
h. 06/27/2007 
Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Expert Witness 
Disclosures 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces 
Tacum of Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm. D 
DISFE!NDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 2 
r::r-~ 
" •• ·1 C J • 
Page 4 ot ~ 
i. 06/27/2007 Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Stephen P. Lordon, M.D. 
Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition 
j. 08/13/2007 Duces Tecum of Stephen P. Lordon, M.D. 
(Change of Location) 
k. 08/13/2007 Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Jim Keller, M.P .H., PA-C 
I. 08/13/2007 Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm. D. 
m. 09/25/2007 Pretrial Conference Order Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d) 
n. 09/10/2007 Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures 
o. 09/11/2007 Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures 
p. 09/26/2007 Plaintiffs' Motion In Llmlne 
q. 09/26/2007 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Llmine 
Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Defendant 
r. 09/27/2007 Thomas Byrne, P .A.'s Motion in Li mine Re: 
Various Issues 
s. 09/28/2007 Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institutes' Motions In Limine 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern 
t. 10/01/2007 Idaho Pain Institutes' Memorandum in Support 
of Motions in Llmine 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M,D, ANP SOUTHERN IOAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'$ RE!QUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 3 
Pag~ I ot ~ 
u. 10/01/2007 
V. 10/01/2007 
w, 10/04/2007 
)(, 10/04/2007 
y, 10/04/2007 
%. 10/04/2007 
aa. 10/05/2007 
bb, 10/05/2007 
cc. 10/05/2007 
dd, 10/05/2007 
ee. 10/09/2007 
Memorandum In Support of Thomas J. Byrne's 
Motion in Limine Re: Various Issue& 
Affidavit of J. Will Varin in Support of Clinton 
Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain lnstltute's 
Motions in Limine 
Defendants Clinton Pille, M.D. and Southern 
Idaho Pain tnstltute's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant 
Thomas Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine 
Defendant Thomas J, Byrne's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in limine 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.'s Jolnder In 
Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain 
lnstitute's Motion in Limine 
Memorandum In Response to Defendant's 
Motions in Limine 
Affidavit of J. WIii Varin in Support of Clinton 
DIiie' and the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine 
Defendant Thomas J, Byrne's Supplemental 
Disclosure of Expert Witnesses 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Expert Witness 
Disclosure 
Pretrial Memorandum 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLI:, M,D, ANO SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 4 . 
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ff. 10/09/2007 
gg, 10/09/2007 
hh. 10/09/2007 
ii. 10/09/2007 
"· 10/09/2007 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster In Support of 
Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum 
Reply Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion In Limine 
Defendants Clinton D.ille, M.D. and Southern 
Idaho Pain lnstitute's Reply to Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine 
Defendants Clinton DIiie, M.D. and Southern 
Idaho Pain lnstitute's Jolnder In Defendant 
Byrne's Motion In Llmlne 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.'s Proposed 
Special Verdict Form 
kk. 10/09/2007 Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Trial Brief 
II. 10/09/2007 
mm. 10/10/2007 
nn. 10/10/2007 
00, 10/10/2007 
pp, 10/12/2007 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.'s Proposed 
Jury Instructions 
Defendant's Thomas Bryne, P.A.'s Jofnder in 
Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain 
lnstitute's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendants' Motions in Limine 
Defendant Clinton Dille' M.D. and Southern 
Idaho Pain lnstitute's Trial Brief 
Defendants Clinton Dilte, M.D. and Southern 
Idaho Pain lnstitute's Jury lns!ruction1; 
Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum Re: 
Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller fax 
Page bot~ 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 6 . . . 
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qq. 10/15/2007 
rr. 10/15/2007 
Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum Re: 
Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller 
Affidavit of Chris D. Comstock Regarding the 
Parties' Motions in Limine 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southam 
ss. 10/15/2007 Idaho Pain lnstitute's First Supplement Jury 
Instructions 
tt. 10/16/2007 Order Re: Motions In Limine 
uu. 10/26/2007 
vv. 10/30/2007 
ww. 10/30/2007 
xx. 10/30/2007 
yy. 01/23/2008 
zz. 
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Proposed Jury 
Instructions Filed 
Final Jury Instructions 
Defendants' . Objection to Plaintiffs' 
· Rebuttal Testimony of Dr: Upmari 
Proposed 
Declaration of Counsel in Support of 
Defendants' Objection to Proposed Rebuttal 
Testimony of Dr. Lipman 
Memorandum Opinion end Order RE: Plaintiffs' 
Motion for New Trial 
Coples of all exhibits admitted into evidence, 
excluding Exs. 227-227H (actual pills and pill 
bottles from Coroner's office) 
3. I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been 
served on each court reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named below 
at the address set out below: 
Virginia Balley, P,0, Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0126. 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTl:'S RE:QUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 6 
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rage 6 OT , 
I further certify that this request for additional record has been served 
upon the clerk of the district court and upon all parties required to be served 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
JJU0--
DEFl:NDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'$ REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS - 7 
5S8 
rage :1 oT ':J 1 
CERTl!"ICATI: OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J1~f March 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
David E. Comstock 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
198 N. Capitol Blvd. #500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise. ID 83701-2774 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely E. Duke 
Hell Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA 
702 W. Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701-1271 
Attorneys for Defendant, T. J, Byrne P.A. 
Virginia Bailey, Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
__ U.S. Mail 
_ Overnight Mail 
!:land Delivery 
-~-Fax 344-7721 
_u,S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
_ __,1:iand Delivery 
_:?Fax 395-8585 
..,...,....U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
_ Hand Delivery 
Fax 
J. W !Varin 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILI.E, M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'$ REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS ANO RECORDS - 8 
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ORIGINAL rwmiTR/CT COURT '/h[tgo. /Di,HO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL D1Stltl/!8:1l[AY 30 PM J: 
12 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TIAM.M..EALLS --.......... __ _ 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
and ROBERT P LEWIS, KIM HOWARD 
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., 
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
CLERK 
Case No. CV-05-4345 y1/ -DEPUTY 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF 
JUDGMENT PENDING THE APPEAL 
THIS MATTER Having come before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay 
Execution of Judgment Pending the Appeal and the Court having been advised in the 
premises; a telephonic hearing was held on May 28, 2008. Having considered the 
arguments of the parties and the relevant legal and factual foundations therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER That: 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Execution of the Judgment Pending the Appeal is 
hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER That: 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(15), the posted bond amount for 136% of 
the Judgment, or $35,603.64 will remain with the Clerk of the Court. To the extent that 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY - 1 5 7 0 
the Clerk is able to place the bond in an interest bearing account, while retaining control 
of the bond with the Court, the Court directs the Clerk to do so. 
DATED THIS f:I" day o~ , 2008. 
1/A:1,&2 
~rict Judge Richard Be 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this -3zl_ day of lfl~ , 2008, I served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrum~ethod indicated below, upon: 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
601 W. Bannock St. 
PO Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, PA 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
PO Box 1271 
Boise ID 83701 
David E. Comstock 
Taylor L. Mossman 
Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O.Box 2774 
Boise, ID 83701 
Er 
D 
D 
D 
~ 
D 
D 
D 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile (208) 388-1300 
E-Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile (208) 395-8585 
E-Mail 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile (208) 344-7721 
D E-Mail 
-~~ Clerk of the Court 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT- 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually and as ) 
surviving spouse and Personal Representative ) 
of the Estate of Rosie Schmechel, deceased ) 
and ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD ) 
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, ) 
) 
VS ) 
) 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN ) 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho ) 
Corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., ) 
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
CASE NO. CV 05-4345 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing CLERK'S RECORD on Appeal in this cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by 
Appellate Rule 28. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled 
cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this 12'' day of June, 2008. 
KRISTINA GLASCOCK 
Cl 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE t:: '? '1 t1 (., 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually and as ) 
surviving spouse and Personal Representative ) 
of the Estate of Rosie Sclnnechel, deceased ) 
and ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD ) 
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, ) 
) 
w ) 
) 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN ) 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho ) 
Corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., ) 
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Defendant's Exhibit 223 (methadone label 9/26/03) 
Defendant's Exhibit 223A (methadone pills - photograph) 
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